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I. Introduction
Trade integration in Africa is often viewed in light of the
European Union and other regional integration arrangements like
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). From this
perspective, integration is regarded as necessarily destined to
proceed on a linear path where tariffs and non-tariff barriers are
progressively eliminated, the trade regimes of member countries
are linked together, and eventually their fiscal and monetary
policies are harmonized. In the European experience, trade
integration has been the result of a series of treaty commitments
that also created a supranational organization to which the states
transferred certain types of authority.
Seen in this light, African Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)
contrast sharply with their counterparts in Europe and North
America, where there is a much higher commitment to compliance
with the legal obligations contained in the treaties establishing
them. From this view, African RTAs have not resolved the
"problems of coordination, collaboration or domestic politics" that
treaty regimes are argued to remedy.' In addition, the treaty
commitments in African RTAs do not appear to have raised "the
political costs of noncompliance" such as reputational losses.2 In
short, the existence of regional trade rules and institutions has not
done much to change the behavior of African countries.'
The foregoing views are caricatures that are not based on the
tAssociate Dean for Research and Scholarship and Governor George E. Pataki Professor
of International Law, Albany Law School. Thanks to my research assistants Elizabeth
Trachy, Ryan Manley, Paul Timpone and Joseph Rogers for their help. This article is
part of a book-length project titled AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL
REGIMES (Cambridge University Press forthcoming 2011).
I Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 424 (2000). This is a view strongly associated with
institutionalists.
2 Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L
ORG. 495, 508 (1991) (acknowledging that loss of reputation does promote compliance
but does not guarantee it).
3 See Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences; Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 5-10 (1983); see also Kal
Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 387, 394 (2000) (defining effectiveness in terms of the degree
to which treaty rules produce "observable, desired changes in behavior.").
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actual treaty commitments and experiences of African RTAs.4
This article aims to develop a more accurate account of African
RTAs than do existing analyses. This alternative view is based on
the types of commitments contained in these treaties as well as
how these RTAs are understood by their members.
These treaty commitments and understandings show that
African RTAs are designed as flexible regimes. Flexibility here
refers to the following defining features of African RTAs: First,
these RTAs are regarded as establishing flexible regimes of
cooperation as opposed to containing rules requiring scrupulous
and rigorous adherence. Second, African RTAs incorporate as a
central feature the principle of variable geometry, adopting steps
for meeting time tabled and other commitments. Third, African
RTAs adopt a broad array of social, economic and political
objectives without giving salience to any set of objectives. Fourth,
African RTAs demonstrate a particular preference for functionally
specific objectives to undertake discrete projects and to serve as
forums for the integrated development of common resources, such
as river basins that cut across national boundaries. Fifth, African
RTAs demonstrate a remarkable commitment to the equitable
distribution of gains from trade and a corresponding weakness in
the adoption of non-discrimination trade principles and the related
objectives of trade liberalization. Sixth, African RTAs are
characterized by multiple and overlapping memberships,
exemplifying a classic case of the "spaghetti bowl."5  Multiple
RTA membership illustrates the flexibility of open-door
membership that African RTAs offer.
Understood as flexible regimes, African RTAs therefore
contrast sharply with the views of Jorge Dominguez in the Latin
4 See Andre Philip, Preface to FRIEDRICH KAHNERT ET AL., ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9 (1969). Four decades ago, it was
argued that regional integration in developing countries could not be expected to
"produce spectacular results in the short or even medium term," and that these efforts
would subsequently experience "delays and frequent breakdowns [which] will soon lead
to disappointment and discouragement." Id.
5 See Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade
Agreements, in THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1, 2-3
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne 0. Krueger eds.,1995). A "spaghetti bowl" is a metaphor
used to describe a system in which crisscrossing strands of bilateral trade agreements
create a tangled mess of restrictions and regulations, ultimately disrupting rather than
promoting free trade. Id.
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American context. Dominguez has argued trade integration
agreements have "lax implementation" as a "rule" governing
international relations in the Americas.6 According to Dominguez,
lax implementation is "pervasive and long-lasting across issue-
areas and time periods, unpunished by co-signatories and
generally accepted even when its existence hampered the
procedures or organizations that states sought to create.",
7
Viewing African RTAs as flexible regimes has the advantage
of allowing these RTAs to be understood on their own terms,
rather than as treaty regimes on a path toward becoming much like
their European or North American counterparts. In so doing, it
becomes possible to better and more accurately understand the
challenges that these RTAs have been designed to address and that
have in turn shaped them. As Tiyajana Maluwa has argued,
African countries have preferred informal institutions to the
"bureaucratic strictures and international rule-making or
legislative processes of formal international institutions."8 Indeed,
6 Jorge Dominguez, International Cooperation in Latin America: The Design of
Regional Institutions by Slow Accretion, in CRAFTING COOPERATION: REGIONAL
INTERDEPENDENCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 83, 94-95 (Amitav Acharya & Alastair
Johnson eds., 2007).
7 Id. at 95.
8 Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Move From Institutions? Examining the Phenomenon in
Africa, 100 AM, Soc'Y OF INT'L L. PROC. 294, 294 (2006). Tiyanjana Maluwa used the
New Economic Partnership for African Development, (NEPAD), as an example of this
move away from formal institution building governed by a treaty or rule system. Id. at
295. In his view, the design of NEPAD was as a framework of development cooperation
and interaction outside the African Union. Id. at 295. Tiyanjana argued that NEPAD
reflected a shift "toward action and results rather than legislation and rule making." Id. at
297. In his view, African governments are more likely to accede to objective, voluntary
and peer evaluation measures than "punitive and overly prescriptive measures." Id. at
298. Another example that Maluwa discusses is the African Peer Review Mechanism, a
regional effort to have African countries review each other's governance performance.
Id. at 296-97. While the case of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe shows some difficulty of
voluntary processes, the mechanism has been used in Kenya in 2006 and in South Africa
in 2007. See AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM, KENYA PROGRESS REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM (APRM) NATIONAL
PROGRAMME OF ACTION, available at http://www.nepadkenya.org/Documents/
progress report.jan06.pdf (detailing the progress Kenya has made in implementing
changes since its peer review in 2006); AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM, SOUTH
AFRICAN COUNTRY REVIEW REPORT No. 5 (2007), available at
http://www.aprm.org.za/docs/ SACountryReviewReport5.pdf (detailing South Africa's
progress after implementing the mechanism).
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as this article shows, African RTAs are not overseen by powerful
supranational bureaucracies, but rather by relatively weak
institutions that leave ample sovereignty to their member states.
Tiyanjana Maluwa in essence alludes to a very important and
often overlooked point by pessimists of regional integration in
Africa. These pessimists primarily examine the performance of
African RTAs based on how well member states rigorously
conform their behavior to the formally binding trade liberalization
commitments found within treaties and similar agreements. 9
While there is clearly merit in assessing these rules and institution-
building efforts in light of the goals to which these states have
committed themselves, such an approach misses the following
crucial insights.
The pessimist approach is based on the false belief, similar to
the first generation of African RTAs, that "integration could be
legislated from above, ex nihilo," without reference to what was in
fact possible on the ground." The failure of first-generation
efforts to build RTAs in post-colonial Africa, legislated essentially
from above, is in part represented by the collapse of the East
African Community in 1977 and by the failure of the Mano River
Union economic cooperation arrangement, which was established
in 1973 after its original members, Liberia and Sierra Leone,
experienced civil wars. 1 The Mano River Union was revived
again in 2004.12 The collapse of the East African Community
9 See, e.g., Gino J. Naldi and Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The African Economic
Community: Emancipation for African States or Yet Another Glorious Failure, 24 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 601, 603 (1999) (concluding that "the African Economic
Community will not succeed without sweeping political, economic and legal reforms").
See also Colin McCarthy, Regional Integration in SubSaharan Africa: Past, Present and
Future, in 4 REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN
AFRICA 230 (Oyejide et. al eds., 1999) (arguing that African countries have adopted
over-ambitious regional integration schemes and that this has not been a good policy);
infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text for discussion of specific failings.
10 John Ravenhill, The Future of Regionalism in Africa, in THE FUTURE OF
REGIONALISM IN AFRICA 205, 210 (Ralph I. Onwuka & Amadu Sesay eds., Macmillan
Education 1985).
11 See FRIEDRICH KAHNERT ET AL., ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 67 (1969).
12 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFF., BACKGROUND NOTES: SIERRA
LEONE (06/09), http://www.state.gov./outofdate/bgn/s/ 125195.htm. (last visited Apr. 6,
2010). In 2004, the domestic turmoil began to settle and the first local government
elections in 32 years were held in 311 wards nationwide. Sierra Leone along with Guinea
2010]
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showed the importance of alternative models of cooperation
around discrete projects where gains and benefits could not only
be realizable in the short term, and where the gains were mutually
beneficial to the members as well. In addition, the failure of these
first generation efforts at pan-Africanism showed the limits of
ambitious projects driven by the desire to unify in ending colonial
rule and apartheid that could not easily be translated into projects
of economic cooperation in post-colonial Africa. In fact, long
before the collapse of the East African Community in 1977, "the
vision of an African common market in the neo-
classical/comparative advantage model had disappeared by
1965. ' 13 By the late 1970s, regional trade integration in Africa,
Asia, and the Caribbean was declared to have been in "various
degrees of serious crisis, in states of stagnation or in processes of
disassociation.
14
In light of such a legacy of failure, economic and political
cooperation could therefore hardly be remedied by a regionalism
based exclusively on a neo-classical/comparative advantage model
and be expected to succeed. Thus in the second generation of
RTAs that followed the collapse of the first, the role of treaty
commitments became that of providing a framework for joint
ventures or initiatives in areas including trade, investment, and
capital, while also extending further into transport, security, water,
electricity supply, and labor movement, as well as agreements for
the management of common resources such as river basins.' 5 Not
only was the range of objectives increased, but flexibility was built
into these RTAs by allowing functionally specific objectives and
and Liberia formed the Mano River Union (Cote d'Ivoire later joined in May 2008). Id.
13 Miguel S. Wionczek, Introduction-Present Status and Prospects of Economic
Integration Movements in Developing Countries: Political Atomization and Economic
Backwardness of the Southern Hemisphere, in ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN LATIN
AMERICA, AFRICA AND ASIA 1, 8-9 (1969); see also United Nations Economic
Commission on Africa, Background Paper on the Establishment of an African Common
Market, No. E/CN.14/STC/20 (Oct. 13, 1963); United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa, European Integration and African Trade, U.N. Publ. No. E/CN. 14/STC/4
(Aug. 23, 1964) (displaying that the vision of African economic integration was a
popular theme in the early part of the 1960s).
14 Constantine V. Vaitsos, Crisis in Regional Economic Cooperation (Integration)
Among Developing Countries: A Survey, 6 WORLD DEV. 719 (1978).
15 See Yongzheng Yang & Sanjeev Gupta, Regional Trade Arrangements in
Africa: Past Performance and the Way Forward 5 (IMF, Working Paper 05/36, 2005).
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incorporating the principle of variable geometry as outlined above
and discussed more fully in this article.
This contrasts sharply with an approach to regional integration
that is primarily or solely focused on trade integration and that
requires rigorous formal compliance with liberalization
commitments within specific time frames. This does not of course
preclude such treaty commitments having solemnly binding
obligations. 6 Indeed, many if not all African RTAs have exactly
those kind of commitments. 17  In short, flexibility is not
necessarily incompatible with assuming legally binding
commitments. Often these obligations are assumed on the
understanding that compliance will not be stringently enforced
because the commitments are balanced against a variety of safety
valves, such as the principles of variable geometry and the
equitable sharing of the benefits of regionalization.
There are several other examples of flexibility in African
RTAs. As noted above, these RTAs adopt flexibility by
incorporating rules that provide different obligations between
members, as well as differences in timelines to comply with
commitments that are based on the varying economic capabilities
of their members. For example, in the Treaty for the
Establishment of the East African Community, the principle of
variable geometry allows the commitments in the treaty to be
undertaken at different speeds.' 8 The principle of asymmetry
allows variances in measures of economic integration, building
flexibility right into the framework of RTAs. In the South African
Customs Union (SACU), flexibility is achieved in part by allowing
protection of new industries from competing goods from SACU
and non-SACU countries for a period of no more than eight years
16 See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA-HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (Harvard
Univ. Press 1995).
17 See, e.g., Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community
Common Market, art. 47(1), Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://eabc.info/node/410 ("The
Partner States undertake to approximate their national laws and to harmonize their
policies and systems, for purposes of implementing this Protocol."). Article 47(2) goes
on to provide that the "Council shall issue directives for purposes of implementing this
Article," Id. at art. 47(2).
18 See infra Part III.
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for the poorest SACU states.19 In addition, as noted below,
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are entitled to tariff assistance
for industries of major importance to their economies.2 ° Tariffs
with regard to such industries may only be decreased with the
concurrence of a country that has designated such an industry as
being of importance to it.2 The question of flexibility is addressed
in more detail in Part II.
RTAs also provide an umbrella within which bilateral and
even inter-regional links are formed among a group of countries
along functional lines, and whose benefits are often more
immediately available than through trade liberalization. This in
turn has spurred "sectoral planning and coordination"22 which is
19 Southern African Customs Union Agmt. Art. 26, Oct. 11, 2002 ("The
Government of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia or Swaziland may as a temporary measure
levy additional duties on goods imported into its area to enable infant industries in its
area to meet competition from other producers or manufacturers in the Common
Customs Area, provided that such duties are levied equally on goods grown, produced or
manufactured in other parts of the Common Customs Area and like products imported
from outside that area, irrespective of whether the latter goods are imported directly or
from the area of another Member State and subject to payment of the customs duties
applicable to such goods on importation into the Common Customs Area (2). Infant
industry means an industry which has been established in the area of a Member State for
not more than eight (8) years. (3). Protection afforded to an infant industry in terms of
paragraph I shall be for a period of eight (8) years unless otherwise determined by the
Council. (4). The Council may impose such further terms and conditions as it may deem
appropriate.").
20 See infra Part W.A.
21 See Southern African Customs Union Agreement art. 26, Oct. 11, 2002,
available at http://www.sacu.int/main.php?include=docs/legislation/2002-agree
ment/main.html [hereinafter SACU Agreement]. Article 26 of the SACU Agreement
makes provision for protection of infant industries for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and
Swaziland. Id. Article 34 of the SACU Agreement provides for the revenue sharing
formula which determines the respective shares of the members of the total customs,
excise and additional duties. Id. art.34. See also Jan Isaken, Prospects for SACU After
Apartheid, in SOUTHERN AFRICA AFTER APARTHEID: REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND
EXTERNAL RESOURCES 182 (Bertil Oden ed., 1993). In addition, South Africa may give
sympathetic consideration to increasing the customs duty on imports of competing goods
as well as to reducing such duty for materials that are used in the production of goods
designated as being of importance by Botswana, Swaziland or Lesotho. Id. art. 2 (stating
that one of SACU's objectives is to "facilitate the equitable sharing of revenue arising
from customs, excise and additional duties levied by Member States").
22 Emang M. Maphanyane, SADCC-Future Challenges, in SOUTHERN AFRICA
AFTER APARTHEID: REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND EXTERNAL RESOURCES 174, 175 (Bertil
Oden ed., 1993) (arguing that SADCC initially decided to undertake "large programmes
in agricultures, transport, communications and the energy sector."). Maphanyane further
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now a major feature of African RTAs.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part I discusses how
flexibility enmeshes well in the African context, with examples
showing how African RTAs have adopted the classic Vinerian
customs union model as well as their adoption of multiple
objectives. This part also discusses how African RTAs act as
forums for integrated development and functionally specific
projects. These projects are often nestled within the RTAs, and
they include cooperation on issues relating to security and
common river basin management. Part I ends with another feature
of RTAs' enmeshment in the African context-the view that
African regionalism is a bulwark for economic self- independence.
Part II discusses how African RTAs have adopted variable
geometry as a mechanism for ensuring equality in the sharing of
the benefits of trade liberalization and how the prevalence of this
concern has back-grounded the commitment to non-discriminatory
trade liberalization. In this part of this article, I discuss at length
the highly significant April 2009 East African Court of Justice
(EACJ) advisory opinion on variable geometry and its
implications for African RTAs. Part III focuses on another
important feature of African RTAs as flexible regimes-multiple
memberships in RTAs. Part III begins by reviewing the
phenomenon of multiple membership and the advantages it offers
African countries with such multiple memberships. It then
proceeds to examine the resulting "spaghetti bowl" effect of these
multiple RTAs and assesses the transaction costs associated with
it.
II. Flexibility as Enmeshment in the "African" Context
A. Adaptations of the Vinerian Model
African RTAs, like others in the Third World, exhibit
differences from the classic European market-based customs union
integration model.23  Under the European model, economic
integration starts with a free trade area, then progresses to a
notes that "the basis of cooperation was the discrete project. This had the effect of
making the benefits of cooperation immediate and tangible, and also of building
confidence among member states." Id.
23 See C.A. Cooper & B.F. Massell, Toward a General Theory of Customs Unions
for Developing Countries, 73 J. OF POL. ECON. 461,475 (1965).
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customs union, then to a common market, and finally to an
economic union, with a political union as the last stage.24 This
classic integration model associated with Jacob Viner 25 came
under serious scrutiny as a model for Third World integration
many decades ago. 26  The Vinerian model was developed in an
industrial context, while many developing countries were agrarian
and raw material producing. The Vinerian model, for example,
assumed that trade creation or trade expansion would outweigh
trade diversion when trade barriers were lifted.27 This assumption
is often undermined since a majority of African economies have
largely similar products without necessarily having comparative
cost advantages between them sufficient to overcome this
similarity.28 The resulting lack of complementary trade in effect
undercuts gains in trade. Under such conditions, firms in African
RTAs end up trading with high-cost producers within the region,
rather than with low-cost producers from outside the region.29 The
small size of most of these economies also means that significant
24 See generally BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
(Greenwood Press 1961) (summarizing the basic elements of the integration model).
25 See JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace 1950); see also J.E. MEADE, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS
(Greenwood Press 1955); R.G. LIPSEY, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS: TRADE
DIVERSION AND WELFARE (Economica, New Series 1957).
26 See, e.g., Cooper & Massell, supra note 23, at 461; Robert Loring Allen,
Integration in Less Developed Areas, 14 KYKLOS 315 (1961); Gerald M. Meier, Effects
of a Customs Union on Economic Development, SOC. & ECON. STUD., Mar. 1960, at 29;
R.F. Mikesell, The Movement Towards Regional Trading Groups in Latin America, in
LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND COMMENTS, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
(A.O. Hirschman ed., 1961); ROBSON, infra note 74; R.F. Mikesell, The Theory of
Common Markets as Applied to Regional Arrangements Among Developing Countries,
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY IN A DEVELOPING WORLD (Roy Harrod & Douglas
Hague eds., 1963) (all criticizing the Jacob Viner integration model).
27 See infra Part IV.E for an extended discussion.
28 See KAHNERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 23. (The traditional doctrine is based on
differences in resource endowments which explain differences in factor prices.
However, if one abstracts from natural resources in mining and agriculture, developing
countries may not show very different resource endowments. In a general way, scarcity
of capital and skilled labour, scarcity of entrepreneurial talent, usually considerable
amounts of unemployed unskilled labour, and in many cases even no shortage of land
resources, are some of the characteristics of developing countries.) On similarity of
factor endowments among developing countries, see id. at 31-35.
29 One consequence of trade liberalization under regional integration schemes in
developing countries is a rise in non-tariff barriers. See Vaitsos, supra note 14, at 746.
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economies of scale are not realizable without enlarging the market
through regionalism. This is exacerbated by the fact that
economic integration in Africa, even while otherwise enlarging
market sizes, does not lead to globally significant increases in
productivity, productive area, or purchasing power of the enlarged
market relative to productive areas and markets in other regions.3"
In addition, African integration arrangements have often resulted
in protecting high-cost multinational or local firms that have
commanded market share by producing for a segmented market
within the individual countries and subsequently within a region.31
Some economists therefore argue that African economies need
structural changes because they do not exhibit the conditions
under which integration can confer benefits on them.32 This is in
part because developing countries tend to trade with developed
countries more than they do with each other.33 In addition, their
national outputs are dominated by trade with developed
economies, mainly in exporting unprocessed raw materials.34 The
argument here is that African economies need more than the
increase in market size created by a common market because the
increase in market size may be marginal relative to other
30 Arthur Hazlewood, Problems of Integration Among African States, in AFRICAN
INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION 1, 6 (Arthur Hazlewood ed., 1967).
31 See infra Part II (discussing reasons for adoption of variable geometry); see also
Allen, supra note 26, at 317-34 (discussing the conditions under which the Vinerian
customs union model are feasible).
32 Maurice Bye, Structural Changes Required by Growth, in TRADE THEORY IN A
DEVELOPING WORLD 161 (Roy Harrod and Douglas Hague eds., 1963). See also Vaitsos,
supra note 14, at 751 (arguing that the traditional theory of integration influenced by
Ricardian comparative advantage theory and neo-classical economics did
not address itself to the issues of major interest on development, namely how
the process of integration will dynamically change the structural conditions of
production and technology, the process of inter-commodity and inter-activity
(rather than simply inter-country) substitution, the dynamics of resource
diversification going beyond the questions of specialization, the composition of
investments and expectations, the capacity for absorbing externalities, etc.).
33 Yongzheng Yang & Sanjeev Gupta, Regional Trade Arrangements in Africa:
Past Performance and the Way Forward 18 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/05/36, 2005)
("For many RTAs, intra-arrangement trade as share of their total external trade remains
below intra-Afiican trade as share of total African external trade.").
34 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN
AFRICA 19 (2004) (noting that primary products accounted for sixty-four percent of
African exports in 1995).
2010]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
limitations for firms such as high production costs and very low
levels of income that make the effective size of regional markets
small."
Thus, as noted more frilly below, a primary goal of trade
integration in Africa became that of promoting large scale
production with a view to shifting trade patterns from external
sources.36 The idea was that such a production shift would in turn
result in foreign exchange savings that could then be used to
produce what was imported from outside Africa from the newly
established production facilities within Africa.3" In retrospect, this
adaptation of the Vinerian model turned out to be a pie in the
sky-yet it is an idea not wholly abandoned in African RTAs even
today.38
Import substitution policies were another initial response to
this classical customs theory, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s.39
These policies have increasingly been abandoned through
multilateral treaty commitments, particularly since the 1990s.40
The Vinerian customs union theory was also adapted through a
variety of devices to avert unequal integration gains between
35 See Hazlewood, supra note 30, at 9 (making reference to the view that "the
present cash market of most African countries individually is not larger than that of a
moderately sized European town").
36 See infra Part II.E.
37 See REGINALD H. GREEN & ANN SEIDMAN, UNITY OR POVERTY: THE ECONOMICS
OF PAN-AFRICANISM 265 (Penguin 1968); see also FUAT ANDIC, SUPHAN ANDIC AND
DOUGLAS DOSSER, A THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
ILLUSTRATED BY CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES (Allen & Unwin 1971). See generally STAFFAN
LINDER, TRADE AND TRADE POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT (Praeger Series on International
Economics and Development 1967) (suggesting that trade creation would hurt poor
economies because it would disrupt the desired country distribution rules and suggesting
ways of overcoming such losses through establishment of common industries in the
"least-cost" partner).
38 See infra section II.C and accompanying notes (discussing functional specificity,
RTAs as forums for integrated development of common resources, the equitable
distribution of gains from trade, and the principle of variable geometry).
39 See Economic Commission for Latin America, The Latin American Common
Market, UN Publication No. 59.1I.G.4 (New York 1959).
40 See Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade
Order: Lessons from the Past, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 513, 516 (discussing the
replacement of import substitution policies with trade liberalization via multilateral
agreements).
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integrating economies, a theme addressed more fully below."
Today, while developing countries have largely abandoned import
substitution policies, many have yet to fully liberalize their
economies under the GATT/WTO obligations they have
assumed.
Currently, African RTAs are not based on an approach that
focuses on whether countries are complying point by point with
regional trade treaty commitments. As such, regionalization
grows not only out of formal institutions but independently of
them as well. Daniel Bach has, for example, argued that while
regionalism focuses on institution building and the conclusion of
formal arrangements, regionalization-a much broader concept-
arises from "transactions and interactions" both formal and
informal that a variety of state and non-state actors engage in
within these regional spaces.43 In fact, Africa has had its own
forms of interregional interactions that predate the advent of
colonial rule." While these interactions need not be overstated,
we also must not lose sight of the manner in which colonial rule
41 See KAHNERT ET AL., supra note 11, at 16 (arguing that the fact that trade theory
(in the Vinerian model) "failed to integrate considerations of income distribution fully
into its general framework is a serious shortcoming which invalidates many of its
conclusions in terms of political feasibility and even political desirability").
42 See WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 97 (2007),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/understandinge.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2010). The WTO is also known as the World Trade Organization, and is the only
global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. Id. at 9;
see also WTO, GA7T and Goods Council, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/gatt e/gatt e.htm (last visited April 6, 2010). The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) covers international trade in goods. The workings of the GATT
agreement are the responsibility of the Council for Trade in Goods (Goods Council)
which is made up of representatives from all WTO member countries. Id.
43 Daniel Bach, Foreword, in REGIONALISATION IN AFRICA: INTEGRATION AND
DISINTEGRATION xvii, xvii-xviii (1999). See generally KARL DEUTSCH, THE ANALYSIS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Prentice Hall 1988); Earnest Haas, The Study of Regional
Integration, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH (Leon Lindberg &
Stuart Scheingold eds., 1971); Bjorn Hettne, Globalization, Regionalism and the New
Third World, in REDEFINING THE THIRD WORLD (Nana Poku & Llyod Pettiford eds.,
1998) (all providing alternative conceptualizations of regional integration that go beyond
the linear paradigm of establishing trade integration through free markets).
44 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN
AFRICA 27 (2004) ([Regional integrations have] "been part of Africa's strategy for
economic transformation . . . in some cases for almost a century. The first experiment
with integration, the Southern African Customs Union, began in 1910.").
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created economies that favored the interests of the various
European metropoles at the expense of the colonies,45 and the
manner in which independence subsequently restructured these
interactions around the ideologies of sovereignty and
nationalism.46
RTAs today are caught at the cross-roads of seeking to
overcome the defining features of separate countries whose goals
encompass economic, political, social and cultural objectives, in
addition to the traditional integration goals of trade liberalization.
This is a regionalism tethered by the commitment to separate
nations but strengthened by regional connections in trade and
other domains among an economically, religiously, socially and
politically diverse group of countries. As noted below, perhaps
because of this diversity, it is not surprising that objectives such as
regional security and the welfare of the citizens are salient within
these RTAs. These trade-plus objectives are contextualizing
imperatives of African regional integration. From this perspective,
African RTA treaties contain a multiplicity of objectives-after
all, trade integration cannot be achieved without simultaneously
pursuing other objectives. For example, insecurity is a major
barrier to trade integration, and any regional integration efforts
that do not address insecurity as an objective would be atypical.47
45 See GREEN & SEIDMAN, supra note 37, at 127. ("[T]he existing economies of the
separate African states were created under colonial control, the very opposite of the free
market conditions which are assumed to be necessary for the best international division
of labour. The economic principle of colonial rule dictated government in what was
believed to the best interests of metropolitan capital, in short the operation of a colony as
if it were a subsidiary company.")
46 Unfortunately, post-colonial nationalism overstated the national state and
excluded alternative notions of nationhood that preexisted the advent of the post colonial
state in Africa and Asia. See, e.g., Donald Rothchild & Robert L. Curry, Jr., SCARCITY,
CHOICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN MIDDLE AFRICA 228 (Univ. of California Press 1978)
(arguing that colonialism left "behind a patchwork of many sovereign states, but the
states spawned by this process were themselves artificial entities"); Makau Wa Mutua,
Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Legal and Moral Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 113
(1995) (arguing that these artificial inherited African States lack moral and legal
legitimacy). See generally PARTHA CHARTERJEE, NATIONALIST THOUGHT AND THE
COLONIAL WORLD: A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE (Univ. of Minnesota Press 1993)
(analyzing the relationship between nationalism and colonialism); BENEDICT ANDERSON,
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM
(Verso 1991) (same).
47 See, e.g., East African Community, Regional Peace and Security,
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Africa is a diverse continent, composed of countries with
dramatic differences in their legal regimes, religious and cultural
values and norms, economic endowments, political regimes, and
historical heritage. At one level, this contrasts with the European
Union, which was "built on commonalities of economic interest,
politics and culture" '48 and which also gave primacy to economic
integration. In Africa, by contrast, it is important to pursue links
across a broad array of indicators to set the context within which
trade integration will be successful. Such a broad range of
objectives would overcome what Arthur Hazlewood argued was "a
conclusion of despair that mutually beneficial economic co-
operation requires close similarity of social and political
outlook."49 The first generation of African RTAs were narrowly
focused on trade integration to the exclusion of other objectives
and in so doing underestimated the importance of cooperating on a
broad range of objectives.50
Thus, today it would be a mistake to simply regard African
RTAs merely as "cognitive representations and formal
arrangements."5 1 Rather, African RTAs must be regarded in light
of the initiatives and processes including state-society
relationships that are cumulatively establishing regionalism in
modem Africa.52 It is apposite to note here that even in the
European Union, it would be inaccurate to presuppose that its
http://security.eac.int ("Peace and Security has been acknowledged as critical to creation
of the right environment upon which regional integration in all aspects can be fostered.")
(last visited Feb. 11, 2010). Recently, the East African Community Council of Ministers
argued to be an incomplete integration scheme without cooperation on defense and
security matters. Id.
48 Jose E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded
Trade Regime, 7 WID. L. SYMP. J. 1, 15 (2001).
49 Arthur Hazlewood, Economic Instrumentalities of Statecraft and the End of the
EAC, in INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN EAST AFRICA 123, 137 (Christian Potholm
& Richard Fredland eds., Univ. Press of America 1980).
50 See John Ravenhill, The Theory and Practice of Regional Integration in East
Africa, in INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN EAST AFRICA 37, 51 (Christian Potholm
& Richard Fredland eds., Univ. Press of America 1980).
51 Bach, supra note 43.
52 See JAMES N. ROSENAU & ERNST-OTTO CZEMPIEL, GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (Cambridge Univ. Press 1992)
(arguing that as in other areas of global governance, non-state actors have become
integral in the creation of regionalism in Africa). See also JAMES THUO GATHII, WAR,
COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010).
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integration has been achieved solely or purely through legal
transformations through the European Court of Justice. As J.H.H.
Weiler has argued, "legal and constitutional structural change" had
been crucial to European integration, "but only in their interaction
with the Community political process."53 One African leader put it
best: "The basis of our cooperation, built on concrete projects and
on specific programmes rather than on grandiose schemes and
massive bureaucratic institutions, must be assured the mutual
advantage of all participating states. 54
In other words, looking to concrete projects that are mutually
beneficial, as well as the manner in which political and other
processes are working towards building of regional integration, is
equally as important as legal and institutional perspectives that
focus primarily on states as unitary actors. Joseph Nye cautioned
several decades ago that "scholars studying integration in Africa
must remember the primacy of politics and not be misled by
assumptions natural to 'developed' societies. It is important to
pay attention to social, historical, and economic factors. 5 5 That is
why this article adopts a multifaceted approach which follows
both the legal and institutional efforts being made to build
regionalization. It also considers the interactions among national
and regional trade officials and non-state actors including business
groups, institutions, and professionals,56 examining the extent to
which their increased interactions have influenced the realization
of regional commitments in trade and related areas.57 This article
53 J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2407 (1991)
(emphasis added).
54 Ravenhill, supra note 10, at 217 (quoting Sir Sereste Kharma, the first president
of Botswana).
55 JOSEPH NYE, PAN-AFRICANISM AND EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATION 250 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1965).
56 See International Plant Protection Convention,
https://www.ippc.int/index.php?id=1110589&L--0 (follow "Core Activities" hyperlink;
then follow "Commission (CPM)" hyperlink). Consider, for example, the establishment
in April of 2006 of an East African Phytosanitary Information committee by scientists
under the auspices of the International Plant Convention Treaty which, though intended
for information sharing purposes, nevertheless dovetails particularly well with building
capacity for phytosanitary trade related issues. Id.
57 See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1409-1410 (1999); Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 181 (1986); Harold Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
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therefore explores not only the treaty commitments made in the
RTAs, but also other types of instruments containing trade and
non-trade agreements between and among African states such as
ministerial declarations and memorandums of understanding.58
Such informal decisions taken within the context of RTA
commitments that are designed to take advantage of regional
complementarities help in building and consolidating regional
integration initiatives such as infrastructural projects. In doing so,
African RTAs have adapted to an environment often characterized
by political instability and inter-country inequality that would
threaten a grand scheme of integration that was exclusively based
on a Vinerian customs union model.59
B. Flexibility as Enmeshment in the African Context
Flexibility does not make African RTAs any less significant
than those agreements in other parts of the world that are thought
of as more rule-bound. Indeed, highly legalized legal regimes are
now not necessarily thought of as superior to those that are not
highly legalized.6" In one context, high legalization is defined by
the extent to which obligation, precision, and delegation of a
1502 (2003) (explaining what Koh terms as vertical internalization or absorption of rules
of international law into domestic legal systems). Koh explains that
the key to understanding whether nations will obey international law ... is
transnational legal process: the process by which public and private actors-
namely, nation states, corporations, international organizations and non-
governmental organizations-interact in a variety of fora to make, interpret,
enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of international law. The key
elements of this approach are interaction, interpretation, and internalization.
Those seeking to create and embed certain human rights principles into
international and domestic law should trigger transnational interactions, that
generate legal interpretations, that can in turn be internalized into the
domestic law of even resistant nation states.
Koh, 55 STAN. C. REv. 1479, 1502 (2003).
58 See Andrew Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1823, 1879-84 (2002). Though sometimes regarded as informal relative to
the more solemn formal treaty commitments, these types of decisions are now regarded
as sources of obligations between states. Id.
59 See Ravenhill, supra note 10, at 221-22.
60 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 1, at 434 (arguing that the choice of soft norms
by an international organization may be necessitated by seeking consensus as a way of
limiting costs, including contracting costs).
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formal instrument may serve an important purpose.6 However, in
a different context, such legalization may not necessarily serve the
best interests of the parties since it may not "enmesh" well within
the economies, political frameworks, and normative commitments
of a particular regime.62 Yet, where parties to formal and informal
agreements are continuously reiterating their commitments and
making new ones, this contributes to the process of gradually
building the regime's norms and rules, as well as the political will
and economic investment necessarily to give these norms and
rules efficacy. For example, the increasing absorption of regional
rules into national law of RTA member countries, as well as the
continual building of a cadre of international trade lawyers with
expertise who are increasingly working for RTA members or for
the RTAs themselves, are important initial steps in building the
efficacy of RTAs as legal regimes.63 Clearly, though, African
RTAs do not eschew legalization even while embracing policy-
based integration. Thus Article 5(3) of the Treaty for the
Establishment of the African Economic Community provides for
possible sanction against a member state that "persistently fails to
honour its general undertakings under this Treaty or fails to abide
61 See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401,
401 (2000). ("[O]bligation means that states or other actors are bound by a rule or
commitment or by a set of rules or commitments. Specifically, it means that they are
legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that their behavior there under is
subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures and discourse of international law,
and often of domestic law as well. Precision means that the rules unambiguously define
the conduct they require, authorize or prescribe. Delegation means third parties have
been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes;
and (possibly) to make further rules.").
62 See Claire R. Kelly, Enmeshment as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 303, 304 (2005); see also Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss,
Strengthening Compliance With International Environmental Accords: Preliminary
Observations from a Collaborative Project, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119, 124 (1995).
The two scholars have suggested that the degree to which countries cooperate under a
regime such as an RTA will depend upon factors such as "the character of the activity,
the character of the accord, country characteristics, policy, history, leadership,
information, the role of ... NGOs, actions of other states, and the roles of international
governmental organizations." Id.
63 See Lawrence R. Heifer, Karen J. Alter and M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of
Effective International Adjudication: Constructing An Intellectual Property Rule of Law
in the Andean Community, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2009). The efficacy of the intellectual
property regime of the Andean Community has been attributed in a large part to a cadre
of well-trained legal professionals. id.
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by the decisions or regulations of the Community."'4 Article 29(2)
of the Treaty for the Establishment of a Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa gives primacy of the decisions of the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
Court of Justice over those of the member countries on questions
relating to the interpretation of the treaty.65 Such primacy is not
only unusual among international tribunals, including the
International Court of Justice, but also in light of previous
decisions of African courts when confronted with conflicting RTA
treaty provisions." Notwithstanding these examples, rather than
being highly legalized regimes, African RTAs are flexible
arrangements. A Southern African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC) report observed that:
Flexibility does not imply absence of institutions: it creates
a need for bodies able to build, modify, and phase out
arrangements. What it does imply is avoiding massive,
interlocked institutional structures in which the
institutional frame (not the content of the programme)
becomes the justification of continued cooperation in one
field [and is] magnified into a general crisis of
regionalism.67
Thus, one significant manner in which African RTAs show a
specific enmeshment particular to Africa is that they have focused
less on building rigorously formal commitments backed up by
sanctions, but rather on building flexible frameworks of
development, coordination, and cooperation that give countries
their choice of activities that interest them most.68 In this sense,
64 See Treaty for the Establishment of the African Economic Community art. 5(3),
June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241 (1991). Such Council imposed sanctions "may include the
suspension of the rights and privileges of membership and may be lifted by the
Assembly upon recommendation of the Council." Id.
65 Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, art.
29(2), Nov. 5, 1993, available at http://about.comesa.int/attachments/149_090505_
COMESATreaty.pdf.
66 See Okunda v. Republic, (1970) E. Afr. L. Rep. 457 (Kenya), affirmed by E. Afr.
L. Rep. 460 (asserting supremacy of Kenyan law over a competing East African
Community statute).
67 Ravenhill, supra note 10, at 212 (citing Southern African Development
Coordination Conference, First Steps Toward Economic Integration: Interests,
Instrumentalities 36 (Arusha: Mimeo 1979)).
68 Id. at 212. ("[A] rigid framework, as was the case with the Treaty for East
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African RTAs often adopt "functionally specific"69 objectives that
do not wrestle sovereignty away from national governments, given
that it is not always clear if intra-regional trade would
"compensate for the inevitable erosion of their autonomy in
policy-making."7  Such flexibility is also important given the
African Cooperation, makes it impossible for countries to participate selectively in those
activities which are of most interest to them ... [and that] flexibility of institutions and
instruments of cooperation is desirable also in that this recognizes that actors' interests
do not remain constant. In part this is related to change in the extra-regional economic
environment. . . .It also anticipates that there will be a continuing rapid turnover of
governments in many African states, possibly accompanied by dramatic shifts in policy.
Since such transformations have often precipitated the collapse of regional institutions in
the past, it is desirable that the framework of cooperation be insulated as much as
possible from the consequences of sudden withdrawal of a member state. Flexible
arrangements improve the prospects for projects to be continued with a minimum
amount of damage.").
69 See, e.g., Treaty Establishing of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa, supra note 65, art. 4 (providing for broad range of undertakings within each of
the following areas: trade liberalization and customs cooperation (Article 4 (1)(a)-(f));
transport and communications (Article 4(2)(a)-(c)); industry and energy (Article 4(a)-
(d)); monetary affairs and finance (Article 4(4)(a)-(d)); agriculture (Article 4(5)(a)-(g));
and economic and social development (Article (4(5)(a)-(i))); Treaty for the
Establishment of the East African Community, ch. 11- 27, Nov. 30, 1999, available at
http://www.eac.int/ (click on "About EAC" tab and follow "Treaty Establishing the
EAC" hyperlink) (providing for broad range of undertakings, including Chapter 11 (Co-
operation in Trade Liberalization and Development), Chapter 12 (Co-operation in
Investment and Industrial Development), Chapter 13 (Co-operation in Standardization on
Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing), Chapter 14 (Monetary and Financial Co-
operation), Chapter 15 (Co-operation in Infrastructure and Services), Chapter 16 (Co-
operation in the Development of Human Resources, Science and Technology), Chapter
17 (Free Movement of Persons, Labour, Services, Right of Establishment and
Residence), Chapter 18 (Agriculture and Food Security), Chapter 19 (Co-operation in
Environment and Natural Resources Management), Chapter 20 (Co-operation in Tourism
and Wildlife Management), Chapter 21 (Health, Social and Cultural Activities), Chapter
22 (Enhancing the Role of Women in Socio-Economic Development), Chapter 23 (Co-
operation in Political Matters), Chapter 24 (Legal and Judicial Affairs), Chapter 25 (The
Private Sector and the Civil Society), Chapter 26 (Relations With Other Regional and
International Organizations and Development Partners), Chapter 27 (Co-operation in
Other Fields)); see also John Ravenhill, supra note 10, at 212.
70 Ravenhill, supra note 10, 214; see also Maphanyane, supra note 22, at 176
("SADCC eschewed the conventional market integrationist path to regional integration.
A gradualist approach was instead adopted which aimed at consensus and avoidance of
anything that would infringe on national sovereignty that had just been acquired often
through the long and bitter and bloody struggle. It was the most sensible way to proceed
in Southern Africa under the circumstances. Regional integration had to be a maturing
process.")
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diversity not only of the economies of individual members of the
RTAs, but differences based on their culture, geography, ethnicity,
religion, and political allegiances as well. This multiplicity of
identities and loyalties could present insurmountable barriers to
integration if African RTAs were constructed as unitary and
inflexible frameworks. Such rigidity would make cooperation
difficult along any axis as steps are taken towards increasing
legitimacy for broader forms of cooperation within the
heterogeneous nature of African societies. Inflexibility can only
contribute to entrenching resistance to the legitimacy of
cooperative frameworks along any of these lines of difference and
asymmetry. Flexibility by contrast enmeshes very well within this
context of heterogeneity and diversity.
Enmeshment within the African context is also manifested by
the fact that African RTAs bring to the foreground issues of equity
and balance in the relations among their members, while
commitments to the promotion of free trade as a source of
economic growth are relegated to the background.71 This is
informed in large part by the fact that the prospects of regional
integration have often been severely limited by the legacy of
unequal gains from integration,72 not merely because it is market
based, but because it often pits economically richer countries
against economically poorer countries. 73 That is why there has
71 See Carol B. Thompson, African Initiatives for Development: The Practice of
Regional Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 125, 133 (1992).
In its 1992 summit meeting, SADCC adopted a development integration model which
stresse[d] the need for close political cooperation at an early stage of the
integration process, not at the end. Second, it call[ed] for equity and balance
in relations among member states, including compensatory measures for the
weaker members in any transactions that might adversely affect them, such
as trade or monetary liberation. Third, it [saw] a need for increased trade to
be predicated on regional industrial planning, involving regional resource
mobilization.
Id.
72 See Lynn Mytelka, The Salience of Gains in Third- World Integrative Systems, 25
WORLD POLITICS 236 (1973).
73 See NANA POKU, REGIONALIZATION AND SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 15-38
(Palgrave Macmillan 2001). In the South African context for example, South Africa was
the imperial power both within the South African Customs Union and SADC in the
colonial and apartheid eras when South Africa played a destabilizing role against the
frontline states that were opposed to apartheid. Id. Poku further notes that "SACU is
unlikely to provide the framework for greater regionalism for the simple fact reason that
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been a longstanding argument in favor of compensatory schemes
for poorer African countries in the initial stages of economic
integration with richer countries so that integration commitments
do not impose high administrative costs without immediate
advantages.74
C. African RTAs as Forums of Integrated Development and
Functionally Specific Projects
In addition, African RTAs often serve as forums for integrated
development of common resources with their secretariats or
various arms serving as inter-governmental agencies for such
purposes.75 For example, the East African Community nestles
within it the Lake Victoria Basin Commission, which coordinates
the management and utilization of the basin among three of the
five community states which share the Lake Victoria Basin.76
There is a long history of integrated development of river basins
among African countries, some nestled within economic
integration arrangements7" and others that were developed by
the ending of apartheid has not eradicated a general suspicion among countries of
southern Africa of South Africa's imperial project." Id. at 89.
74 See PETER ROBSON, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 285 (arguing that
Gambia's integration within UMOA would deprive it of its monetary autonomy unless a
mechanism for the equitable distribution of benefits and costs between the countries
involved was devised). See also infra Part II (addressing the various types of
compensatory arrangements devised in African RTAs to close the gap in opportunities
between poor and richer members of an RTA).
75 See, e.g., S.K.B. ASANTE ET AL., TOWARDS AN AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
15 (Africa Institute of South Africa 2001) (arguing in favor of increased efforts to
harmonize and promote the implementation of joint projects given "the small size of
most African economies").
76 See East African Community - Lake Victoria Basin Commission,
http://www.lvbcom.org (last visited April 14, 2010). Among the goals of this
autonomous body within the East African Community are: "harmonizing policies and
laws of the Lake's environment and catchment area; the management and conservation
of aquatic resources including fisheries; promotion of investments and development in
the basin and the revamping of the transport system on and around the Lake." Id. at 1.
Also nestled within the East African Community as an institution of the Community is
the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization, established by the member States in 1994 by
treaty to manage the Lake's fisheries resources. See generally Lake Victorian Fisheries
Organization: An Institution of East African Communities, http://www.lvfo.org/.
77 See UKA EzENwE, ECOWAS AND THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF WEST AFRICA
114-16 (Palgrave Macmillan 1983). For example, Gambia and Senegal have long sought
to cooperate on the exploitation of the Gambia River Basin within UMOA. Id. See also
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longstanding treaties entered into during the colonial period.78
Some have called this approach "development integration.
79
Moreover, these integrated development arrangements have
sometimes been designed with re-distributional considerations.8"
In short, African RTAs do not merely center integration
around a vision of market-led integration.8  They are also
designed as forums for a variety of initiatives, such as facilitating
cooperation around common resources like international rivers and
basins among riparian states 82 and cross-border challenges that
include trade,83 security84 and health.85 Rather than simply using
Peter Robson, Problems of Integration Between Senegal and Gambia, in AFRICAN
INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION 115, 126-28 (Arthur Hazlewood ed., 1967) (noting
Gambia's economic weakness relative to Senegal and the challenge of ensuring
opportunities available to equalize gains between the two countries). The author also
notes that the two countries entered into a defense agreement under which cooperation
on mutual assistance from external threat was agreed. Id.
78 See Fasil Amdetsion, Scrutinizing the Scorpion Problematique: Arguments in
Favor of the Continued Relevance of International Law and a Multidisciplinary
Approach to Resolving the Nile Dispute, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 19-27 (2008) (analyzing
the best example of a longstanding treaty entered into during the colonial period, the
1929 Agreement Between Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan governing the Nile River
basin).
79 See W. Andrew Axline, Underdevelopment, Dependence and Integration: The
Politics of Regionalism in the Third World, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE THIRD
WORLD 25 (Pradip Ghosh ed., 1994).
80 See Oliver S. Saasa, Background to Regional Integration in Africa, in JOINING
THE FUTURE: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA 1, 14 (1991).
81 See id. at 21. ("[The] emphasis on non-market components of regional
integration in developing countries ... in no way implies that production efficiency and
considerations of costs are irrelevant. To the contrary, it is fully acknowledged here that
since such vehicles for integration involve astronomical sums of money and demand
joint programming and execution, market integration that demands cost considerations
and rational responses to price signals is important. Instead it is suggested that
integration derived advantages usually result from areas of cooperation in which the
market alone is not the principal variable accounting for such economic benefits.").
82 See Kathy L. Powers, Why Do States Pursue Water Cooperation through
Regional Trade Agreements? Trade, Environment and Security Linkages in International
River Basins (Sept. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the American
Political Science Association).
83 See Edward D. Mansfield & Rachel Bronson, Alliances, Preferential Trading
Arrangements, International Trade, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 94 (1997).
84 See Kathy L. Powers, International Institutions, Trade and Conflict: African
Regional Trade Agreements From 1950-1992, Ph.D Dissertation, Ohio State University
(200 1); David Bearce, Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace, 47 INT'L STUD. Q.
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the expansion of intra-regional trade as a framework for industrial
growth, product diversification, and the improvement of the global
competitiveness of these products as ways of overcoming small
domestic markets, African RTAs were and continue to be seen as
frameworks for development cooperation." As Oliver Saasa put
it, this approach "is fundamentally dependent upon increased
industrial production through specialization, exploitation of
economies of scale, external economies, coordinated programming
and development of infrastructure."87 Here, regional cooperation
is at the level of production in the arenas of capital and labor,
rather than merely in trade.88 This amounted to industrial planning
in many regions complete with licensing legislation designed to
"encourage investment in industry serving the regional market. '89
347 (2003).
85 See Vincent Agu, Alexandre N. Correia & Kazem Behbehani, Strengthening
International Health Co-Operation in Africa Through the Regional Economic
Communities, 14 (3-4) AFR. J. OF HEALTH SCI. 104, 105 (2007) (noting in part that "[o]ne
of the important lessons arising . . . is that effective integration requires more than
reducing tariffs and quotas. Wide ranging policy measures (which go beyond traditional
trade policies) are needed to remove barriers which have the effect of segmenting
markets and impeding the free flow of goods, services, investments, and ideas.").
86 See EZENWE, supra note 77, at 45.
87 Oliver S. Saasa, Economic Cooperation and Integration Among Developing
Countries, in JOINING THE FUTURE: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND CO-OPERATION IN
AFRICA 20 (Oliver Saasa ed., 1991). Saasa further argues that
contrary to the neo-classical theory of integration, increased, planned and co-
ordinated industrial infrastructural development that recognizes the
efficiency and developmental roles of industrial complementarity,
specialization, external economies and economies of scale should be primary
goals of Third World regional integration efforts. Thus trade expansion in
these countries should be perceived as a tool for expanded industrial
production, and not the other way around.
Id. at 25.
88 See ARTHUR HAZLEWOOD, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE EAST AFRICAN
EXPERIENCE 14 (St. Martin's Press 1975).
89 Id. at 121. Hazlewood also notes that the
Raisman Commission had been unsympathetic to the use of the licensing
system as an instrument of industrial development planning, and it did not fit
easily into the market-oriented regulatory scheme of the Treaty [of the East
African Community]. Under the Treaty, industrial licensing was to continue,
but only until 1973, when the existing licenses expired, and no new
industries were to be scheduled.
Id. at 121-22. Instead of depending on regulation through a licensing scheme, the treaty
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For this reason, regional integration in Africa has been and
continues to be based on such planning, "rather than laissez faire
forces. 90
A major impetus to approaching integration with emphasis on
cooperation at the level of production, and not simply in trade, is
its dual emphasis on distributional equity amongst members, 91
(rather than merely on market efficiency and competition between
firms), and on providing a forum for cooperation on agreed
projects that have tangible benefits for regional development. 92
This has led advocates of regional integration in Africa to suggest
that the initial stages of trade integration should be "production-
oriented and task directed approaches to economic integration
which necessarily imply coordinated industrial production at the
regional level."93  This explains why the objectives of many
African RTAs have a huge number of sector-specific cooperative
goals. In turn, such objectives play a significant role in setting the
has "established a market regulator, the transfer tax being the main device for
influencing market forces in the desired direction." Id. at 168. Note also, that under the
Treaty, trade and development were to take place under market conditions rather than
state planning or industrial licensing "as influenced by a common system of fiscal
incentives and by the activities of the East African Development Bank." Id. at 127.
90 Ravenhill, supra note 10, at 210.
91 This desire for compensatory and corrective measures to accompany African
RTAs takes into account the reality of highly unequal trading partners within one
regional group. In East Africa, for example, Kenya is the dominant economy relative to
the other members. This was one of the major reasons for the dissolution of the original
East African Community in 1977. See Agrippah Mugomba, Regional Organizations and
African Underdevelopment: The Collapse of the East African Community, 16 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 261, 261-63 (1978). The new East African Community carefully balances the
goals of trade integration with that of distributional equity and variable geometry
(defined as the principle of flexibility which allows for progression in co-operation
among a sub-group of members in a larger integration scheme in a variety of areas and at
different speeds), the principle of asymmetry (which the treaty defines as a principle
which addresses variances in the implementation of measures in an economic integration
process for purposes of achieving a common objective), and distributional equity as
fundamental principles of the community. See Treaty Establishing the East African
Community, supra note 69, art. 6(e) and (h).
92 See Oliver S. Saasa, SADCC Industrial Co-Operation and Donor Support, in
JOINING THE FUTURE: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA 59 (1991).
93 Id. at 59. One problem with such an approach is that where competing industries
in different countries in a region are operating at below full capacity, the incentive for
engaging in coordinated regional planning and investment is not very high. See EzENwE,
ECOWAS, supra note 77, at 33.
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stage for trade among cooperating countries, which, after all, is a
prerequisite for undertaking regional trade liberalization.94
In this sense, integration is regarded as a diplomatic strategy of
cooperation on a range of issues including infrastructural,
industrial, political and economic concerns, 95 as well as for
balancing forces between the RTA members on the one hand and
the global economic system on the other.96 Some have argued that
94 Ravenhill, supra note 10, at 210 (arguing that it cannot be assumed that there
already exists a basis for integration where there are "low levels of development and...
limited possibilities for profitable inter-regional exchange."). This kind of sectoral
integration has been referred to as neo-functional integration in so far as it seeks to
promote transnational activities around a set of functional needs. See ERNEST HAAS, THE
UNITING OF EUROPE 313 (Stanford Univ. Press 1958); Ernest Haas, The Study of
Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy of and Anguish of Pre-Theorizing, in
REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 3, 23-24 (Lindberg et al. eds., 1971).
Notably, the limits identified by all these theorists about the absence of interest groups
and "modem associational groups" supportive of regional integration decades ago is no
longer accurate. In the East African Community for example, there is a very active East
African Business Council as well as the East African Law Society. Theorists who have
postulated that absence of such groups was not consistent with achieving regional
integration include Haas, supra at 14-15 (arguing that "absence of pluralism makes the
formation of voluntary groups on a regional basis very difficult"). Joseph Nye,
Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model, in REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 192 (Lindberg et al. eds., 1971) (arguing that the
absence or weakness of such groups and political parties deprive regional bureaucrats of
necessary allies); and Ravenhill, supra note 50, at 48-50 (arguing that low levels of
economic development preclude the emergence of such groups).
95 See Saasa, supra note 87. Arthur Hazlewood also argues that "the operation and
development of services, such as transport, communications, electric power, and
research, in common is a further measure of integration between states. Integration of
this kind can operate even where there are no other forms of integration between the
states." Hazlewood, supra note 30, at 4-5.
96 See Timothy M. Shaw, Towards a Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa,
in THE FUTURE OF REGIONALISM IN AFRICA, supra note 10, at 14. See generally GUNNAR
MYRDAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND UNDERDEVELOPED REGIONS (Harper & Row 1957)
(warning that adopting market based integration ideals among members with huge
differences in the levels of economic development among countries would result in
benefitting more developed member countries at the expense of poorer ones). According
to Myrdal, "[t]he freeing and widening of markets will often confer such competitive
advantages on the industries in the already established centers of expansion, which
usually work under conditions of increasing returns, that even the handicrafts and
industries existing earlier in the other regions are thwarted." Id. at 28. See also PETER
ROBSON, INTEGRATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND EQUITY: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST
AFRICA 33 (Unwin Hyman 1968) (arguing that a linear approach to integration which
merely focused on reallocating resources based on the theory of comparative advantage
without more would not necessarily be beneficial for developing countries). Constantine
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this approach of integration by projects, rather than through
integration of markets, has accentuated underdevelopment rather
than solved development problems.97 This issue of distributional
equity and its merits and demerits is addressed at further length in
Part II below.
D. Multiplicity of Objectives: The Merits and De-Merits of
Nestling Non-Trade Objectives in African RTAs
As we saw above, African integration often forewent
development cooperation without wholly abandoning trade
integration.98 Thus critics of African integration have missed the
mark by failing to appreciate the importance of African RTAs as
frameworks for developing political consensus among their
members around regional challenges, including those involving
development, politics, or security. In short, while RTAs are
established through treaty frameworks, operationally they are
forums for addressing regional challenges and developing political
consensus on how to cooperate.99 There is indeed evidence
showing that there are gains in non-trade areas, such as security,
arising from economic integration arrangements associated with
commercial institutions like regional trade agreements.'00 There
are a variety of ways in which economic integration arrangements
provide a framework for resolving security and other regional
problems. For example, countries that belong to a regional
integration framework like an RTA may regard the increased
expectations of benefits from regional trade and investment as
raising the opportunity costs of war. In addition, RTAs provide a
forum for negotiating peaceful outcomes.'0 ' Paul Collier has
Vaitsos has suggested that the content and social legitimacy of integration arrangements
in a developing context should take account of their social economic and political
structures, the needs for development and the new conditions such as internal dynamics
and integration effects. Vaitsos, supra note 14, at 736. Such an approach serves an
alternative to a linear market-led process imported from elsewhere.
97 See Vaitsos, supra note 14, at 720.
98 See Maphanyane, supra note 22, at 175 (noting it is often erroneously argued
that SADCC "does not have a programme of market integration through trade").
99 For similar arguments in the context of linking non-trade issues like human
rights within the WTO, see Alvarez, supra note 48, at 15.
100 Bearce, supra note 84, at 347.
101 See PAUL COLLIER, WARS, GUNS AND VOTES: DEMOCRACY IN DANGEROUS
PLACES 191-96 (Harper 2009).
2010]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
recently shown that although many African countries are small
and poor, their military spending is high and often wasteful. °2
Collier suggests that cooperation is the solution to curtailing the
arms race in Africa."0 3 However, cooperation in the absence of
enforcement would only encourage a country's "neighbors to
coordinate reduction in their military spending while not doing so
itself."'104
In addition, regional institutions established under the auspices
of an integration arrangement may provide information about the
military capabilities of member states to each other so that each is
able to assess the probable results of a war compared or contrasted
with peaceful bargaining. Consequently, even where disparities
are apparent, such institutions may help to cement trust so that
power asymmetries will not be exploited in the future.'05 These
institutions bring together their executive and military leaders
periodically, thereby providing a forum within which they can
interact and hopefully develop some trust amongst themselves in
order to achieve peaceful bargaining and resolution of conflicts." 6
Thus, the nesting or nestling of security and development matters
within trade integration agreements is a significant but overlooked
102 Id. at 117.
103 Id.
104 Id. suggesting designating a "policeman" to oversee military spending in
addition to implementing restrictions on arms exports).
105 Bearce, supra note 84, at 358.
106 Id. See also Thomas Ohlson & Stephen J. Stedman, Towards Enhanced Regional
Security in Southern Africa?, in SOUTHERN AFRICA AFTER APARTHEID: REGIONAL
INTEGRATION AND EXTERNAL RESOURCES 106 (Bertil Oden ed., 1993). ("[Security
cooperation] would be an excellent instrument for confidence-building and increased
transparency with respect to armed forces, the quality and quantity of military arsenals,
actual and perceived threats and threat projections, etc. Second, it could provide a useful
framework for regional conflict management and resolution. Third, it could provide the
framework for an orderly planned, coordinated and mutually agreed regional
disarmament process, involving reduced military spending, force level and hardware
reductions, and conversion projects. Fourth, it could, with time, contribute to
institutionalization that could further a process of equity based regional cooperation and
integration over a wide range of issues, including but not only, economic issues.
Conversely, dealing with economic and security aspects of cooperation and integration in
the same framework could-if progress is made in the economic arena-contribute to
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phenomenon since it does not fit in especially well with standard
integration models such as the one involving the Economic
Community.1 °7
As a Nigerian Minister for External Affairs once noted:
while focusing on certain economic development issues
to be solved by sub-regional integration, the integrations
in the ECOWAS have not failed to recognize the import
of security. Integration and development are only likely
to be guaranteed in the context of peaceful political and
socio-economic environment, both at the national and
sub-regional levels. Hence, the first decade had also been
characterized by certain forms of defence cooperation
and initiatives. 10
8
Indeed, in the context of the Eastern Community of Western
African States (ECOWAS), trade integration was very early
recognized as incapable of being pursued while ignoring economic
development and regional security issues.10 9 After all, trade
integration was not possible within a context of insecurity both
among and within the member states.110  Thus, soon after
ECOWAS was established, a non-aggression pact was entered into
in 1979 which also called on the member states to recognize the
current borders."1  In 1981, the states entered into a mutual
defense pact to repulse external aggression or armed internal
conflict. 2  Security coordination and cooperation were
institutionalized with the establishment of permanent structures of
conflict management, prevention, and resolution."3
107 Bearce, supra note 84, at 363.
108 IKE NWACHUKWU, NIGERIA AND THE ECOWAS SINCE 1985: TOWARDS A
DYNAMIC REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22 (Ministry of External Affairs, Republic of Nigeria
1991), as cited in Bearce, supra note 84, at 364.




113 Id. It is therefore surprising that some commentators suggested that the idea of
having an Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African Economic
Community was unwise because the cost would be prohibitive and "the achievements of
the deliberations do not always have much probative value." See Professor 0. Akanle,
The Legal and Institutional Framework of the African Economic Community, in
AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TREATY: ISSUES PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 31 (M.A.
Ajomo & Omobolaji Adewale eds., 1993). This view does not take into account the
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It is in this sense that Thomas Ohlson and Stephen J.
Stedman's argument that "conflict, insecurity and
underdevelopment are inextricably interlinked in Southern
Africa," is true of most of sub-Saharan Africa." 4  The types of
conflicts include those involving control over territory and
governments; inclusion and exclusion in governance based on race
and identity; inequitable resource distribution; and insecurities
created by war and reconciliation in light of vast imbalances in the
distribution of military power. 15 Conflicts have had a decisive
impact on regional integration efforts in Africa, particularly given
that those regions with the most conflict have witnessed the
slowest growth in regional integration." 6 In the horn of Africa,
the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), one
of the African Union's designated regional economic
communities, primarily focuses on rebuilding security in the
region."' In South Africa, insecurity surrounding in-migration of
African workers resulted in riots and violence in 2008, indicating,
yet again, the potentially conflicting nature of migration across
borders. 8 Today, the importance of economic development as a
remedy to violence is increasingly being recognized and
emphasized. 9
E. African RTAs as Bulwarks of Self-Reliance and Economic
Independence
Another aspect of regional integration in Africa that is often
understated is that second generation integration efforts of the post
colonial order were often designed as frameworks within which
potential such forums offer for resolution of challenges such as security. Id.
114 Ohlson & Stedman, supra note 106, at 87.
115 Id. at 88.
116 U.N. ECON. COMM. FOR AFR., ASSESSING REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 1117
(2004), available at http://www.uneca.org/aria2 (follow "Chapter 1: The Drivers of
Regional Integration of Africa's Development" hyperlink).
117 See EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
(Ciru Mwaura & Susanne Schmeidl eds., 2002).
118 See Ohlson & Stedman, supra note 106, at 92; see also Isaken, supra note 21, at
199 (predicting a substantial reduction in the immigration of workers from surrounding
countries for South Africa).
119 COLLIER, supra note 101; AZAR GAT, WAR IN HUMAN CIVILIZATION 658 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2006).
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African countries could eliminate dependence on their former
colonizers with a view to attaining self-reliance. 12  This is
reflected in the seventh preambular paragraph of the Treaty
Establishing the African Economic Community.'12  Some of the
treaties establishing regional economic communities share a
common preambular paragraph. 122  Article 3(b) of the Treaty
Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS) makes "solidarity and collective self reliance" a
principle to be adhered to by the members.' 23  Article 4(l)(a)
provides that the integration of African economies is aimed at
increasing "economic self-reliance" and to promote "endogenous
and self-sustained development."'' 2 4 Similarly, Article 4(b) of the
ECOWAS Treaty provides "solidarity and collective self-reliance"
as a fundamental principle, 12' as does Article 6(b) of the COMESA
Treaty. 126  Article 5(l)(d) of the SADC Treaty makes it an
objective to "promote self-sustaining development on the basis of
collective self-reliance, and interdependence of member states."127
These provisions demonstrate that regional economic
integration in Africa has been justified as a necessary step for
realizing self-sustaining economic development.'28 On this view,
Africa's external economic dependence and its lopsided
120 See, e.g., Monrovia Declaration of Commitment on the Guidelines and Measures
for the Establishment for National and Collective Self-Reliance in Economic and Social
Development for the Establishment a New International Economic Order, July 17-20,
1979, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog
/pHoGAssembly1979.pdf.
121 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, supra note 64, at pream.
para. 7.
122 See Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States
para. 3, Oct. 19, 1983, 23 I.L.M. 945 (1984).
123 Id. art. 3(b).
124 Id. art. 4(l)(a).
125 See Treaty of ECOWAS art. 4(b), May 28, 1975, available at
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id--treaty&lang=en.
126 Treaty for the Establishment of the Common Market for East and Southern
Africa, supra note 65, art. 6(b).
127 Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), art. 5(l)(d),
Aug. 17, 1992.
128 See James Gathii, Third World Approaches to International Economic
Governance, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE 255
(Richard Falk, Balakrishnan Rajagopal & Jacquelin Stevens eds., 2008).
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participation in the international trading system are key factors
accounting for the dismal economic performance on the continent
that are regarded as addressable through economic self-reliance on
a continental level. 1
29
Economic self determination is a theme strongly associated
with the first generation of regional integration efforts in the post-
colonial era. 3 ' For example, Kwame Nkurumah envisioned
Africa's economic unity as a necessary precondition for Africa's
economic self-determination. 3' Many have since argued that
Africa risks being further marginalized if it does not fulfill the
dream of early pan-Africanists like Kwame Nkurumah and Julius
Nyerere. 132  These early pan-Africanists dreamed of a single
African political system within which Africa could address the
challenges of its development and confront the control that its
former colonizers exercised upon it. 33 Today, Mummar Gaddafi




130 See KWAME NKURUMAH, AFRICA MUST UNITE 101 (Panaf Books 1963).
131 Id. at 163. ("I can see no security for African States unless leaders like ourselves
have realized beyond all doubts that salvation for Africa lies in unity. If we are to
remain free, if we are to enjoy the benefits of Africa's enormous wealth, we must unite
to plan the exploitation of our human and material resources in the interest of all our
people."). See also Organization for African Unity [OAU], Lagos Plan of Action for
Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000 (OAU, Addis Ababa, (1980) (affirming the
commitment by African leaders to ensure the economic, social and cultural integration of
the continent under the African Economic Community by the year 2000).
132 See JULIUS K. NYERERE, UJAMAA-ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM (Oxford Univ. Press
1968). Nkurumah is said to have told a meeting in Addis Ababa that "we shall be
haggling and wrangling among ourselves until we are colonized again and become the
tools of a far greater colonialism than we suffered hitherto." THOMAS M. FRANCK, EAST
AFRICAN UNITY THROUGH LAW 3 (Yale Univ. Press 1964) (citing DAVID APTER, THE
POLITICAL KINGDOM OF UGANDA 7 (Princeton Univ. Press 1961)).
133 This model was referred to as the mobilization model. See AFTER, supra note
132, at 4-7 (using the mobilization metaphor). See also FRANCK, supra note 132, at 3,
citing Boutros-Ghali, The Addis Ababa Charter, 546 INT'L CONCILIATION 19 (1964).
134 Gaddafi's proposal for a United States of Africa resulted in a Committee of
Heads of State and Government on the Proposals of the Great Socialist Peoples' Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya chaired by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. The Committee
issued a report titled Report of the Committee of Heads of State and Government on the
Proposals of the Great Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, June 13, 2005,
available at http://www.africa-union.org/Doc/Report of theCommittee of Headsof
State and Government on the Proposals of Libya.doc. The African Union's 50th
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By contrast, another group of pan-Africanists-who would
today be referred to as the gradualists or incrementalists' 35-
subscribed to having a consociational design or loose federation
beginning with "the regions of Africa which have developed a
historical affinity [beginning] to lay the foundations for a wider
unity. '  Today the incrementalists have the upper hand. They
subscribe to economic-and eventually political-unity over time,
although there is no consensus yet on the time frame or on the
precise modalities for proceeding towards such a goal.'37
This looser idea of a federation with regional building blocks
is adopted in the Treaty for the Establishment of an African
Economic Community.' Both the loose federation and political
union ideas share a commitment to self-sufficiency as embodied in
initiatives such as the New International Economic Order of the
1970s. 39 This theme was also reflected in the Lagos Plan of
Action, which linked self-sufficiency to Africa's economic
integration. 4 ° As Thomas Biersteker has explained, economic
Anniversary meeting in 2007 held in Accra, Ghana, was devoted to discussing the report
of the Committee.
135 In their final decision, the Heads of State at the African Union Meeting in Ghana
on the discussion on the "Grand Debate on the Union Government," only agreed to
accelerate Africa's economic and political unity and to further study the proposals of the
Union Government Proposal. See Accra Declaration of the African Union Summit
Meeting (July 3, 2007), available at http://ausummit-accra.org.gh/indexl
.php?linkid=242&page=2&sectionid=303.
136 FRANCK, supra note 132, at 3. The Report of the Committee of Heads of State
and Government on the Proposals of the Great Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya did not embrace the idea of an immediate political union, but instead
reiterated the "need to work towards the ultimate formation of Union Government in
Africa [and] encouraged those parts of Africa that are able to form political federations
to do so." African Union [AU], The Report of the Committee of Heads of State and
Government on the Proposals of the Great Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
at para. 12 (June 13, 2005), (Presented at the AU-CSO Pre-Summit Meeting in Accra,
Ghana).
137 See Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, Study' on An African Union
Government: Towards the United States of Africa, Presented to the Seventh Session of
the Assembly of the Heads of States of the African Union in Banjul (July 2006), available
at http://www.africa-union.org/Doc/studyon_ AUGovernment june2006.pdf
138 See Treaty for the Establishment of an African Economic Community, supra
note 64.
139 ASANTE ET AL., supra note 75, at 1-2; see also JAMES GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
140 Organization of African Unity, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic
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self-reliance or disengagement
is not a call for complete autarky or absolute national self-
sufficiency. Rather, disengagement is a call for a partial
reduction in the magnitude of international economic
transactions with industrial countries and for the attainment
of self-sufficiency only in particular sectors of activities.' 4
This means reducing dependence on foreign investment and
economic assistance, as well as combining extremely limited
individual markets and their scarce resources with a view to being
better able to bargain for foreign capital and technology. 4 2 Most
recently, this theme of economic self-reliance has been embraced
by African leaders like Muammar Gaddafi, who has asked African
leaders not to beg for aid from the West.'43 Another proponent of
African self-sufficiency is Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who has
recently urged COMESA members to pay into its development
fund as a way of cutting dependence on foreign assistance.144
Notably, these supporters of economic integration were all
influenced by Africa's struggles against colonialism, imperialism,
and apartheid.'45
Development of Africa 1980-2000. This plan was adopted at the OAU Meeting in its
Second Extraordinary Session, pmbl. 3(iii), April 28-29, 1980, available at
www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/docs/lagosjplan.pdf (stating "We commit ourselves
individually and collectively, on behalf of our governments and peoples, to establish
national, sub-regional and regional institutions which will facilitate the attainment of
objectives of self-reliance and self-sustainment"); see also KIDANE MENGISTEAB,
GLOBALIZATION AND AUTOCENTRICITY IN AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT IN THE 2 1 ST CENTURY
172 (Africa World Press 1996).
141 Thomas J. Biersteker, Self-Reliance in Theory and Practice in Tanzanian Trade
Relations, 34 INT'L ORG. 229, 231 (1980).
142 GREEN & SEIDMAN, supra note 37, at 80-81 (also arguing that "the continental
market is broad enough to absorb the products of planned industrial and agricultural
growth. But as long as the individual states of Africa attempt to 'go it alone,' few if any,
will achieve the real economic independence and higher living standards to which all
Africans aspire").
143 Paul de Bendem, Gaddafi Urges Self-Reliance at Africa Summit, REUTERS, July
4, 2005, available at http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?setid=l&click-id=68
&art-id=qw I 120478401298B261.
144 See MacDonald Dzirutwe, Mugabe Calls For Self-Reliance, End to Conflicts,
REUTERS, June 7, 2009, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/businessNews/
idlNIndia-40138720090607.
145 ZDENEK CERVENKA, THE UNFINISHED QUEST FOR UNITY: AFRICA AND THE OAU 1
(1977) (noting the similarity in goals among various groups of Africa states "in the
fundamental aims... particularly those concerning decolonization, racial discrimination,
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While the theme of economic self-determination still has its
cache of support, the African Union's New Economic Partnership
for Economic Development (NEPAD) shows a commitment
towards market-friendly development approaches, particularly
with the goal of obtaining foreign funding to finance Africa's
development needs.'46 Thabo Mbeki, the former South African
President, has represented this dual theme of self-sufficiency and
the necessity of foreign funding in his own call for an African
renaissance and his support of NEPAlD. 47  NEPAD aims to
generate both internal and external resources for development.
According to Mbeki, Africa's regeneration depends on its ability
"to generate internal resources" for its development. 48 From the
resources generated from within Africa, a Pan-African
Infrastructure Development Fund (PAIDF) has been set up to
"finance large-scale infrastructural projects."' 49 A fund manager
has been appointed, and by October 2007 the fund had raised $625
million to finance energy, technology, transport, and water
projects in Africa.'5
NEPAD's capital flows initiative is slated to be primarily
funded by western donors who condition access to their funds to
the adoption of market-based policies.15" ' Alongside this
commitment to market based policies within NEPAD, the African
Group at the 2003 Cancun World Trade Organization (WTO)
Ministerial Meeting played a crucial role in the formation of the
maintenance of world peace, and the urgent need for economic cooperation between
African States").
146 See James Gathii, A Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of
Africa's Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development,
13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (2003) (providing information on NEPAD's
origins, background and analysis).
147 President Thabo Mbeki, Address of the President of South Africa to the Joint





150 For more information, see the PAIDF fund manager website at
http://www.harith.co.za/investors/index.html.
151 African Union, New Partnership for Africa's Development Framework 37-39
(Oct. 2001), available at www.nepad.org ("follow "The NEPAD Framework" link).
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"Group of Twenty". 52 The group lobbied heavily in favor of
ensuring that development remained at the center of the latest
round of the WTO's trade negotiations.'53
While the theme of self-sufficiency has been a strong one,
political differences between neighboring countries, as well as the
unwillingness of better-off countries to sacrifice national
economic gains for the sake of regional cooperation, have
hindered the success of the movement towards self-sufficiency.
5 4
The move towards self-sufficiency has also been delayed because
many African countries are competing with each other as potential
locations for industrialized-country firms, or as suppliers of raw
materials to developed economies or the quickly growing
economies of India and China.'55 Often the competition for
industrialized-country firms may be regarded as outweighing
regional integration, particularly if the choice is presented as one
that might involve giving up the prospects, real or perceived, of
foreign investors who will manufacture for export. 56  Such a
choice would certainly look brighter than regional cooperation,
especially if such cooperation would involve the sharing of
benefits with weaker member States.' 57 A large number of African
countries have passed legislation giving foreign investors very
attractive incentives in this race for their capital, skills, and
technology. '58
152 FATOUMATA JAWARA & AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE
REAL WORLD OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS/THE LESSONS OF CANCUN xv (Zed Books 2004);
see also James Gathii, The High Stakes of WTO Reform, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1361, 1366
(2006).
153 JAWARA & KwA, supra note 152, at xix.
154 Ravenhill, supra note 50, at 37.
155 Id. See also Jian-Ye Wang, What Drives China's Growing Role in Africa? 23
(Working Paper No. 07/211, 2007).
156 Wang, supra note 155, at 5.
157 Ravenhill, supra note 50, at 49.
158 For example, the 1991 Investment Code in Uganda set up the Uganda
Investment Authority whose primary purpose is to promote foreign investment in
Uganda. See Uganda Investment Authority-Our Mission, Vision, And Role,
http://www.ugandainvest.com/uia.php?uhpl=mission&&uhpll=Mission,Vision,Role. In
Rwanda, Law No. 14/98 of 12/18/1998 established the Rwanda Investment Promotion
Agency with the mandate of promoting foreign investment in the country. See Rwanda
Investment Promotion Agency, http://www.gov.rw/economy/
rwanda-investment-promotion-agencyhtm.
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Thus, within the African Union, and particularly insofar as
regional economic integration is concerned, one sees a
commitment to a number of varied approaches. There is the
continuing theme of economic self-reliance, but there is also the
recognition of the importance of foreign funding embraced within
NEPAD, as well as the continuing efforts to realize more
favorable trading relationships with the rest of the world within the
WTO. 15 9 This multifaceted approach was best captured in the first
Africa Forum for Dialogue organized by the Africa Union in
Geneva by the Director General of the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization, who declared that the challenges
facing Africa had to be met by Africans and that while Africa "can
blame colonialism for the past 350 years" it cannot do so for the
next 50.16° Echoing the same view, Jean Ping, the African
Commission's Chairperson, noted that, while Africa has unequal
economic relations with the rest of the world, this did not mean
that Africa did not need the rest of the world or that it could
dispense with the need to open up.
161
A common theme that cuts across the range of responses to
Africa's economic challenges is the consensus on strengthening
regional economic cooperation. As a result, the Accra Declaration
arising from the African Union's 50th Anniversary Meeting in
2007162 resolved to review and shorten the time frame towards the
establishment of an African economic community and to use the
regional economic communities to achieve these objectives.163
159 See AFRICA AND DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: THE
NEPAD DEBATE (J. 0. Ad~sinA, Yao Graham and A. Olukoshi, eds., 2006).
160 Annelise Sander, Africa Should Seize Control of Its Development, Inter Press
Service News Agency, May 29, 2009, available at http://allafrica.com/
stories/200905290267.html.
161 Id.
162 The meeting was timed to coincide with Ghana's 50th Anniversary of
Independence. Ghana was the first African country to be freed from colonial rule. Ghana
Gov't Offical Portal, Ghana at a Glance, http://www.ghana.gov.gh (click on "About
Ghana"; then "Ghana at a Glance") (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
163 See Accra Declaration of the African Union Summit Meeting (July 3, 2007),
available at http://ausummit-accra.org.gh/indexl .php?linkid=242&page=2&
sectionid=303. The Declaration memorialized the intent of the parties "to accelerate the
economic and political integration of the African continent." Id. 1. The parties also
agreed
to rationalize and strengthen the Regional Economic Communities, and
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III. Variable Geometry: A Defining Aspect of African RTAs
The strategy of promoting trade liberalization ... without
concomitantly phased positive policies promises to be a
recipe for stagnation. 64
If the economic characteristics of the countries of Africa
are examined in the light of these various criteria for a
beneficial customs union, it would appear that the
formation of customs unions in Africa was irrelevant, if not
positively harmful. 
165
[N]on-trade equilibrating mechanisms . . . must be built
into multinational economic cooperation schemes; if the
regional development process is left to liberalization and to
market forces alone, these schemes are bound to fail.166
The aim of this part of the paper is to show how variable
geometry is a central feature of African RTAs as flexible regimes.
Part II begins by outlining the origins of this principle and giving
examples of how various African RTAs incorporate and use it.
The last section then discusses the April 2009 advisory opinion of
the East African Court of Justice on the appropriate relationship
between the principle of variable geometry and the rule of
consensus decision making in the Treaty for the Establishment of
harmonize their activities, in conformity with our earlier decision, so as to
lead to the creation of an African Common market, through the stages set in
the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty),
with a reviewed and shorter timeframe to be agreed upon in order to
accelerate the economic and where possible, political integration.
Id. at 2(a).
164 ROBSON, supra note 96, at 123.
165 Hazlewood, supra note 30, at 6.
166 Wionczek, supra note 13, at 15. Wionczek notes that arrangements to ensure
equitable sharing of regionalization benefits include
a regional development bank; a regional mechanism for financial seWments
and for monetary policy coordination; a regime harmonizing incentives for
regional and external private investment; an instrument for the promotion of
industrial specialization by agreement; and a formula for the equitable
distribution of customs revenues and other taxes, with due account being
taken of the development needs of the most backward participants.
Id. at 16.
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the East African Community.
Although variable geometry is a central feature of African
RTAs, it has largely been overlooked, in the legal literature on
RTAs. In the African context, variable geometry refers to rules,
principles, and policies adopted in trade integration treaties that
give member states, particularly the poorest members: (i) policy
flexibility and autonomy to pursue at slower paces time-tabled
trade commitments and harmonization objectives; (ii) mechanisms
to minimize distributional losses by creating opportunities such as
compensation for losses arising from implementation of region-
wide liberalization commitments and policies aimed at the
equitable distribution of the institutions and organizations of
regional integration to avoid concentration in any one member;
and (iii) preferences in industrial allocation among members in an
RTA and preferences in the allocation of credit and investments
from regional banks.
Variable geometry therefore limits more ambitious trade
liberalization goals since it is designed to accommodate less well-
off or unwilling members of an RTA that are concerned about the
economic and political costs of liberalization for themselves in the
short run. From this perspective, it is arguable that African RTAs
undercut the more stringent multilateral (GATT/WTO)
liberalization commitments that their members have assumed. In
fact, African RTAs do not systematically adopt the unconditional
most favored nation treatment. 167  When this other non-
discrimination principles are adopted, they rarely, if ever, are used
to challenge adoption of discriminatory trade measures.1 68 This is
167 See Yongzheng Yang, Africa in the Doha Round: Dealing with Preference
Erosion and Beyond 9-10, 21-33 (IMF Policy Discussion Paper No. 05/8, 2005).
168 For example, Article 43 of the Treaty for the Establishment of ECOWAS
provides for the Most Favored Nation Treatment in the following terms:
(1) Member States shall accord to one another in relation to trade
between them the most favored nation treatment. In no case shall tariff
concessions granted to a third country by a Member State be more
favourable than those applicable under this Treaty.
(2) Any Agreement between a Member State and a third country under
which tariff concessions are granted, shall not derogate from the obligation
of that Member State under this Treaty.
(3) Copies of such agreements referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article
shall be transmitted by the Member States which are parties to them, to the
Executive of the Secretariat of the Community.
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most acutely demonstrated in the East African Court of Justice's
recent decision on variable geometry.'69 In this advisory opinion
that the Council of Ministers of the East African Community
sought from the Court, the Council framed the issue not as one of
squaring the principle of variable geometry and that of non-
discrimination under the Treaty for the Establishment of the East
African Community, but as a question of reconciling the principle
of variable geometry and that of consensus decision making. 70
A. Reasons for the Adoption of Variable Geometry
One of the greatest impediments to regional integration
schemes in Africa has been the question of unequal benefits that
accrue from integration that is primarily focused on trade
liberalization. 7 ' Distributional equity in African RTAs is not only
Treaty of ECOWAS, supra note 125, art. 43. This provision not only establishes the
classic most favored nation treatment within ECOWAS, but it also prohibits member
countries from giving third countries more favorable treatment than that made available
to ECOWAS member countries. It further obliges Member States to report any
agreements in which tariff concessions are made to third countries to the Executive of
the Community Secretariat. Notably, the provision "in no case shall tariff concessions
granted to a third country by a Member State be more favourable than those applicable
under this Treaty" of Article 43(1) of the ECOWAS Treaty does not definitively
establish the type of unconditional MFN obligation in Article 1 of GATT 1947.
GATT Article 1 obliges members of the WTO to extend on an unconditional and
immediate basis "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity ... to any product
originating in or destined for any other country ... to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties." General Agreement on Tariffs
& Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
Article 35 of the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS) establishes the Most Favored Nation norm in exactly the same
terms as Article 43 of the ECOWAS Treaty. However, the ECCAS Treaty has a fourth
sub-paragraph not present in the ECOWAS Treaty. Article 35(4) of the ECCAS Treaty
provides: "No member shall conclude with any third country an agreement whereby the
latter would grant such Member State tariff concessions not granted to the other Member
States." Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States art.
35(4), Oct. 18, 1983.
169 See In the Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the East African
Community for an Advisory Opinion, App. No. 1 of 2008 Opinion (E. Afr. Ct. of Justice
at Arusha, First Instance Div. April 24, 2008) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion Request].
170 See infra Parts III.C-E.
171 Saasa, supra note 87, at 14. Saasa notes that the "management of distributional
questions has . . .remained a difficult task in most, if not all, integration schemes in
developing countries." Id. at 15. See also EZENWE, supra note 77, at 58-65, 151
(declaring "ECOWAS represents another glaring case of a partnership of unequal
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a question of the asymmetrical economic benefits of trade
integration, but also a function of unequal "networks of power,
information and knowledge"'' 7 2 between African economies.
Compensating countries that suffer losses from liberalization
commitments has long been identified as one of the "most serious
difficulties" encountered in the integration process.173 This is
reflected in the technological and economic dominance of
countries like Kenya in East Africa, Nigeria in West Africa and
South Africa in the Southern African region.' 
74
Differences in the benefits of cooperation in Africa date back
partners"); U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., Current Problems of Economic Integration:
The Distribution of Benefits and Costs of Integration Among Countries U.N. Doc.
TD/B1/394 (New York, 1973). For the case of Latin America, see Mathew Edel,
Regional Integration and Income Distribution: Complements or Substitutes?, in THE
MOVEMENT TOwARD LATIN AMERICAN UNITY 185 (Ronald Hilton ed., Praeger 1969).
Edel notes that
It is felt, for example, that capital, which is normally mobile across borders,
will be drawn to the region in which wages are lowest, thus helping to reduce
the difference [between rich and poor countries]. However, these effects are
no more certain ... There seem, over long periods in a country or region's
development, to be strong tendencies for industry to concentrate in the
already most industrialized locations. These effects, often described in terms
of 'polarization' 'dominance', or 'backwash' effects, have not been fully
explored in theory, but they seem to have a basis in economies of scale in
infrastructure, external economies in the labor market and elsewhere, and
mutual support of market demand created in advanced sub-regions, when
trade throughout the region even free of tariffs is subject to transport costs.
Id. at 189.
172 Saasa, supra note 87, at 2.
173 Philip, supra note 4, at 9. Phillip notes that
the aim of preventing a widening gap between participating countries ...
[make it] essential that financial compensation should be given to the weaker
members. But in any association of poor countries, this compensation
cannot be provided without external help. In a situation where international
aid is stagnating, if not declining every country considering participating in
an attempt at regional integration will be convinced that the aid granted to
the integrated group will turn out to be less than the sum of the aid
previously granted to the same countries individually.
Id. at 10.
174 Severine Rugumamu, Africa 's Search for Regional Cooperation and Integration
in the Twenty-First Century, AFRICAN CAPACITY BUILDING FOUNDATION, Working Paper
No. 3, at 12 (2004), available at http://www.acbf-
pact.org/knowledge/documents/ACBF%20WORKING%20PAPER%20NO.%203.pdf.
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to the colonial period.'75 The East African Community, whose
origins date back to 1917,176 had a long history of disputes about
Kenya's disproportionate benefits relative to then Tanganyika and
Uganda. 77 Kenya not only had a bigger share of the employees of
175 See FRANCK, supra note 132, at 28-54 (explaining how white settlers pursued
East Africa Federation during the colonial period with opposition from Africans
culminating in a Hilton Young Commission and hearings in London in 1931 before a
Joint parliamentary committee at which African representatives protested against
federation in East Africa). See also Arthur Hazlewood, The Economics of Federation
and Dissolution in Central Africa, in AFRICAN INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION 248,
249 (Arthur Hazlewood ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (noting that the removal of all
trade restrictions between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
together with the development of a common tariff, disadvantaged Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia; for Nyasaland's case, "fiscal transfers failed to compensate for the
adverse effects of the customs union"). This problem has arisen in a variety of
developing country regional arrangements as well. For example, Article 39 (Promotion
of Industrial Development in Less Developed Territories) of the 1965 Caribbean Free
Trade Association Agreement (Text Consolidating the Provisions of the Principal
Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement) allowed the less developed territory upon
application to suspend area tariff treatment of imports "in order to promote the
development of an industry in any of those Territories." See Wionczek, supra note 13, at
150.
176 See Hazlewood, supra note 88, at 22-23. Hazlewood notes that the features of
the East Africa Customs Union completed in 1927 included
an external tariff common to the three territories, but enacted separately in
each territory; a single collection of import duty at the point of entry into
East Africa and subsequent free movement of imported goods within East
Africa the allocation of customs revenue between the territories on the basis
of 'derivation', that is according to the territory of ultimate destination, the
allocation being based on information from the Transfer forms which were
returned to the customs administration when goods were moved between the
territories; free trade between the territories in products of East African
origin and from 1949 a common customs administration. In addition, there
was free movement of capital and substantially free movement of labour.
The economic unity of the area was supported, and transactions with the area
fostered by a common currency and the common administration of transport
and communications and other 'infra-structure'.
ld.
177 Id. at 21. Hazlewood also notes that, for example, "in 1922, the East African
Customs union consciously embarked on the protective policy it continued to pursue,
and which according to persistent claims by Tanganyika and Uganda has been primarily
protective of Kenyan interests"; that "from 1957 ... it came to be felt more and more
strongly in Tanganyika and Uganda that the customs union was designed for the benefit
of Kenya"; and that "by the 1950s it was widely appreciated that if the integration
arrangements were to survive, their benefits would have to be spread more evenly." Id. at
25-26. For a commentary on Hazlewood's assessment of protective tariffs, see R.N.
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the various institutions of the community, most of which were
located in Kenya, but also the largest share of customs revenue.' 78
Mechanisms to redistribute the gains were put in place from time
to time.79 For example, in 1961 the Raisman Commission
proposed fiscal distributions to compensate for losses suffered
particularly by Tanganyika, but also for the purpose of keeping the
customs union together. 80 Article 87 of the 1967 Treaty for East
African Co-operation sought to end the unequal distribution of the
organs of the Community which were concentrated in Kenya.
Article 87 provided that Arusha would become the headquarters of
the community and its Tribunal; the East African Community
Bank as well as the East African Posts and Telecommunications
Corporation would be headquartered in Kampala, Uganda; Dar-es-
Salaam, Tanzania would be the headquarters of the East African
Harbours Corporation; and Nairobi would be the headquarters of
the East African Railways Corporation and the East African
Airways Corporation. 8' In the Union Douaniere et Economique
de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) established in 1964 between
Cameron, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, and
Gabon, a Solidarity Fund to apportion revenue between the
members as a method of compensating for the differences in
revenue accrued from UDEAC integration. 2
In addition, distributional questions may arise because regional
Wood, The East African Common Market: A Reassessment, 28(3) BULL. OF THE OXFORD
U. OF ECON. AND STAT., Nov. 1966; see also A. J. Brown, Economic Separation Versus a
Common Market in Developing Countries, YORKSHIRE BULL. OF ECON. & SOC. RES.,
May& Nov. 1961.
178 Hazlewood, supra note 88, at 21-26, 38-45 ("The staffing of the Organization
was, in fact, a cause of contention between the countries. There were complaints that an
inordinate proportion of EACSO officials were Kenyans. One reason was that the
headquarters of the Organization were in Kenya, as were most of the other departments
and institutions. It was said to be easier to recruit Kenyans for this reason, and also
because the supply of suitable candidates for the appointments at that time was much
greater from Kenya than from the other two countries.") Id. at 38.
179 Id. at 39-45.
180 Id. at43.
181 Treaty for East African Co-operation art. 87, Kenya-Uganda-Tanz., June 6,
1967, 6 I.L.M. 932.
182 See Peter Robson, Economic Integration in Equatorial Africa, in AFRICAN
INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION 36-41 (Arthur Hazlewood ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1967).
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cooperation pursued "solely on the basis of commercial
integration" often results in an increase in the "bargaining power
of transnational corporations," which then bargain with each
government for the best conditions they can obtain.'83 Regional
integration in developing countries results in the merger of locally-
controlled firms. For example, in the European Union,
competition policy has encouraged mergers of such firms.'84 By
contrast, African regional integration has not encouraged such
mergers, and this often results in local subsidiaries of foreign firms
enjoying the protection of both regional and national tariff walls.'85
From this view, unequal gains in trade integration schemes arise
where integration is solely based on a classical free
market/comparative advantage model.'86 Besides unequal national
gains, integration based on a classical free trade/comparative
advantage model does not necessarily create new opportunities
that induce a greater number of people to enjoy the benefits of
growth in poor economies that largely share the same
characteristics.'87 The adoption of such a model without adapting
it to the African context of huge disparities in the export and
economic power among the countries is one of the reasons for the
failure and ultimate disbandment of the original East African
Community (EAC) in 1977.188 At the time, Kenya's unequal
gains, relative to both Uganda and Tanzania, accentuated the
conflicts among the three countries. Notably, in 1964, Kenya
declined to formally ratify the Kampala Agreement that embodied
"corrective measures" that would have arrested the "growing
inequalities" among EAC members. 8 9
183 Vaitsos, supra note 14, at 729-36 (analyzing transnational enterprises and their
effects on economic integration). See generally Constantine V. Vaitsos, The Role of
Transnational Enterprises in Latin American Economic Integration Efforts: Who
Integrates With Whom, How and for Whose Benefit? (1978) (same).
184 See Vaitsos, supra note 14, at 730.
185 Id. at 730-36.
186 Id. at 739.
187 Id.
188 See generally Richard Fredland, Who Killed the East African Community?, in
INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN EAST AFRICA (Potholm & Fredland, eds. 1980).
See also Saasa, supra note 87, at 14.
189 Saasa, supra note 87, at 14. See also HAZLEWOOD, supra note 88, at 57-68
(discussing Kenya's decision not to ratify the Kampala Agreement even though the
Kenyan President signed it in a meeting with the other Heads of State in January 1965).
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Often distributional questions are exacerbated by regional
insecurity, including civil and other wars as well as a time horizon
problem-gains from integration arise from gains in dynamic
efficiency that take time to materialize. Politicians, by contrast,
focus on short-term gains and losses, yet trade integration schemes
take time for demonstrable benefits to be visible. 9 ' This makes
the utilization of methods of compensating countries that may lose
revenues and other benefits from trade liberalization attractive to
assuage groups that lose out. There is a rough analogy here with
developed economies, like the United States, that establish trade
adjustment assistance programs for industries and workers that
suffer from production or sale losses pursuant to international
trade liberalization commitments. 191
B. Variable Geometry as a Solution ofAdjusting the Costs
and Benefits of Integration
To address this problem, African RTAs have come up with
mechanisms to adjust the benefits and burdens of trade adjustment
between themselves.' 92 Some of these mechanisms of moderating
and containing unequal benefits have been borrowed from other
developing country RTAs.' 93 Over time, they have included both
non-financial and financial redistributive policies. The discussion
Kenya's rejection was a result of Tanzania's reneging on an agreement to establish a
common currency board in East Africa. Id. at 67.
190 See Saasa, supra note 87, at 14.
191 The Trade Act of 1974, as amended, establishes Trade Adjustment Assistance
which authorizes the President to provide relief to workers, farmers, communities and
fishermen seriously injured or threatened with serious injury due to surges of imports. 19
U.S.C. 2251 et seq. (2006). See also 19 U.S.C. 2102 (2006) (stating the purpose of the
Act); The Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(c)(5) (2006) (requiring that the President
report to Congress the impact of future trade agreements on US employment, including
labor markets, and that the report be made public). The Trade Act of 1974, in
establishing Trade Adjustment Assistance, also authorizes the President to provide relief
to workers adversely affected by the reduction in production or sales which results from
international competition arising from a free trade agreement. See 19 U.S.C. § 2272
(2006) (listing group eligibility requirements).
192 This is somewhat analogous to the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program in the
United States except that the U.S. assistance is targeted to industries and individuals who
lose out because of trade liberalization while in the African context the assistance is to
the countries that lose out. See 19 U.S.C. § 2101 etseq. (2006).
193 African RTAs have borrowed many variable geometry ideas from the Andean
Community, formerly known as the Andean Pact.
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below illustrates the example of how SACU engages in financial
redistribution through its development account. Non-financial
redistributive policies have included the allocation of key
industries to disadvantaged countries as way of countering the
tendency of investors to "gravitate towards the already developed
member countries."' 94  In the Andean Pact, the following
mechanisms were used:
(1) a relatively longer period to adjust to import
competition; (2) longer time given to them to harmonize
their national tariffs with the common external tariff; (3)
preference for foreign direct investment in the least
developed economies under Decision 24; and (4)
preferential treatment for the least developed states from
the Andean Development Corporation in terms of loans
disbursements. 195
Other mechanisms include having harmonized industrial and
investment policies to make sure that members of an RTA get "a
fair share in the distribution of integration-induced projects and
their benefits,"' 96 advancing generous access to development
funding and credit to less developed countries, as well as
designing tax concessions for them. 97
In the original East African Community, five arrangements
were agreed upon in 1965 to address the imbalances in inter-
territorial trade. These were:
" Shifting the "territorial administration of production by
a number of firms which operated in two or more of the
countries,"
* Instituting "quotas on inter-territorial trade,"
194 Saasa, supra note 87, at 17.
195 Id. at 26 n.9. In addition, such countries can receive "complementary support..
market studies, [and] technical and managerial assistance." Id. at 17. For more on
similar proposals, see EzENwE, supra note 77, at 20-28 (discussing the following
instruments of achieving equity: fiscal compensation; fiscal incentives to influence the
emergent location of industry; regional industrial policy and planned industrial
specialization and planning models). Other similar positive measures designed to help
poorer countries in a regional integration scheme might include permitting them to
"operate less restrictive rules of origin . . . [and] to enter into transitional bilateral
agreements involving balanced trade expansion." See ROBSON, supra note 96, at 121-22.
196 EZENWE, supra note 77, at 56.
197 Id. at 55-56.
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" Allocating "certain major industries between the
countries,"
" Increasing "sales from a country in deficit in inter-
territorial trade," and
" Making "allocations of industry to secure an equitable
distribution of industrial development between the
three countries. '
The creation of these mechanisms to equalize the benefits of
customs cooperation in terms of development and revenue in the
mid-1960s indicate beyond any doubt how the equal sharing of
benefits of development (in terms of the location of factories,
industries, and the like) and trade imbalances were considered
crucial in relations between more and less developed integrating
members. The introduction of measures such as quotas and the
equitable allocation of industries, while important in rebalancing
the inequities, undermined the primary purpose of integration
under a market-based model of free competition among the most
efficient producers. The East African Community Treaty of 1967
continued a variety of these arrangements, though it primarily
adopted market mechanisms for achieving integration.199 For
example, it established an East African Bank with a view toward
investing "more of its funds in each of the two less-developed
partner states than in Kenya," although each state contributed the
same amount to its equity.2"0 Here, the financing of development
projects through a bank, rather than through the previous system
of industrial planning and licensing in East Africa, eventually
198 HAZLEWOOD, supra note 88, at 57.
199 Id. at 168 (noting that the 1967 Treaty of the East African Community
"established a market regulator, the transfer tax being the main device for influencing
market forces in the desired direction," instead the industrial licensing that preexisted it).
In addition, under the Treaty, trade and development were to take place under market
conditions rather than state planning or industrial licensing "as influenced by a common
system of fiscal incentives and by the activities of the East African Development Bank."
Id. at 129. But see Ravenhill, supra note 50, at 44 (noting that "[tihe principal regulatory
device introduced by the Treaty-the transfer tax system--would seem a somewhat
perverse method of attempting to equalize the benefits from regional co-operation for, in
promoting this objective, the principle of the free movement of goods within the region
was breached by the imposition of intra-community tariffs").
200 HAZLEWOOD, supra note 88, at 104. Kenya also contributed "about half of the
total revenue of the General Fund .. . and this fact has led to some feeling that Kenya
subsidizes the other partner states through the General Fund Services." Id. at 92-93.
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collapsed in 1973.2"1 The preference of a bank as opposed to
industrial planning and licensing indicated some movement
toward market-based integration initiatives even in this area of
equalizing the benefits of integration among the members.
Even though the 1967 Treaty Establishing the East African
Community did away with some of Kenya's dissatisfaction with
bearing an unequal burden within the Community, it nevertheless
failed to effectively deal with the issue, and this was a primary
factor leading to its dissolution in 1977.2"' This exposed the
double-edged sword of efforts to equalize opportunities for
countries at different levels of development. As Ravenhill pointed
out more than three decades ago:
Fiscal transfers from more fortunate to less prosperous
members of a regional scheme are in themselves an
insufficient solution to the distribution problem. Such
transfers may amount to little more than the customs
revenue foregone as a result of the exclusion of extra-
regional imports, and are an inadequate substitute for the
employment opportunities and such spinoffs as improved
local skills, technology and infrastructure-not to forget
prestige-which are brought by industrial development.
Manipulation of rates of taxation to encourage substitution
of local production for imports from more developed states
within a region has the effect-regardless of whether this
was the intention--of encouraging the duplication of
inefficient plants within a region. Frequently the primary
beneficiaries of such policies are multinational
corporations, able to establish [an] uneconomic plant
which is protected from competition from within the region
by the tax system, and from extra-regional rivals by the
external tariff. One of the principal justifications for the
creation of customs unions - the realization of the
economies of scale in producing for a larger market - is
201 Id. at 119-23.
202 See Ravenhill, supra note 50, at 42. Ravenhill also notes that even "if the Treaty
had provided an effective long-term answer to the distribution problem, it would still
have to be judged a failure since its inability to furnish means for an immediate
amelioration of the problem was the cause of its inconsequential impact on partner
states' perceptions." Id. at 43.
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also undermined.2 °3
Notwithstanding the questionable efficacy of efforts to
equalize gains, today, almost without exception, the treaties
establishing these regional trade agreements provide for ways of
dealing with unequal gains. For example, Article 21 of the
ECOWAS treaty establishes a "Fund for Co-operation,
Compensation and Development of the Community," while
Article 48 provides for a mechanism to compensate a member
state for loss of import duties suffered as a result of the
liberalization of trade commitments contained in Chapter VII of
the ECOWAS treaty. 2°4 This is anticipated by Article 4 of the
ECOWAS treaty, which specifies ECOWAS' fundamental
principles. 2 5 These include the "equitable and just distribution of
the costs and benefits of economic cooperation and integration.
20 6
Peter Robson argued that the Fund is of "potentially great
importance for promoting positive integration, development and
balance. '0 7
Notably, by embracing distributional equity, African RTAs do
not abandon formal equality. Thus the ECOWAS treaty, like all
203 Id. at 47-48. See also Hazlewood, supra note 30, at 6. Hazlewood also argues
that the trouble with compensatory mechanisms is "that they deprive the country offering
them of revenue. The less-developed members of the union could ill afford this loss of
revenue, particularly as their concessions might have to be very great if their
disadvantages for industry were to be significantly reduced." Id. at 18.
204 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
arts. 21, 48, July 24, 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660. Chapter 7 is titled "Co-Operation in Trade,
Customs, Taxation, Statistics, Money and Payments."
205 Id. art 4.
206 Id. In addition, Article 4(b) makes solidarity and collective self-reliance
fundamental principles. 1d. art. 4(b).
207 ROBSON, INTEGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN
WEST AFRICA, supra note 96, at 119. Robson, however, notes that though the fund
provides compensation for revenue losses, it does not
compensate for the contingent losses from trade creation, which-in the
absence of an effective Community regional policy-could be significant, or
for the important constraints on development policy that the acceptance of
the programme would necessarily impose upon them. In these
circumstances, the less advanced countries may justifiably be tempted to
hang back from implementing formal commitments to trade liberations until
they are assured, either through the ECOWAS Fund or in other ways, that
their interest will be fully safeguarded.
Id. at 121.
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African RTAs, recognizes equality among the member states as a
fundamental principle.0 8 In this sense, therefore, one sees in
African RTAs an interesting recognition of both equality between
States, and of substantive equality in terms of sharing of the
benefits of cooperation.
ECOWAS has set up a Protocol Relating to the Fund for
Cooperation, Compensation and Development of the Economic
Community of West African States. 209 This Protocol sets out the
purposes of the Fund to include:
" Providing "compensation and other forms of assistance
to Member States which have suffered losses as a result
of the application" of the ECOWAS Treaty;
210
" Providing "compensation to Member States which have
suffered losses as a result of the location of Community
enterprises; '
211
" Providing grants for financing development activities' 1
or feasibility studies of such activities;
213
* Guaranteeing foreign investments undertaken pursuant
to ECOWAS treaty commitments;
214
" Providing the "means to facilitate the sustained
mobilization of internal and external financial
resources for the Member States and the
Community;, 215 and
* Promoting "development projects in the less developed
Member States of the Community.,
216
The procedure for compensation is set out in the Protocol
208 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, supra note
204, art. 4(a). (recognizing equality and inter-dependence of Member States as
fundamental principles).
209 Protocol Relating to the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development
of the Economic Community of West African States Nov. 5, 1976 [hereinafter Fund
Protocol], available at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap051176
fund&lang=en.
210 Id. art. 2(a).
211 Id. art. 2(b).
212 Id. art. 2(c).
213 Id. art. 2(d).
214 Fund Protocol, supra note 209, art. 2(e).
215 Id. art. 2(o.
216 Id. art. 2(g).
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Relating to the Application of Compensation Procedures for Loss
of Revenue Incurred by ECOWAS Member States as a Result of
the Trade Liberalization Scheme. 2 7  There is also a Protocol on
Assessment of Loss of Revenue by Member States.21 8 In 2002 for
example, Benin received over 373 million CFA Francs as
compensation for customs revenue lost between the years 1998-
2000.219
Furthermore, Article 34 of the SACU Agreement of 2002
makes provision for a revenue sharing formula among SACU
members:
Member States agree that in determining their respective
shares of the total customs, excise and additional duties
collected in the Common Customs Area during any
financial year, the share accruing to each Member State
will be calculated from three distinct components as set out
in the paragraphs below.22°
With regard to financing the costs of the Secretariat, Tariff
Board, and Tribunal, the treaty provides that it will come from
proportionate deductions from the "gross amounts of customs,
excise and additional duties collected, before distribution" from
customs, excise, and development of SACU components. 22' For
the customs component, a member's share is determined based on
"the value of goods imported from all other Member States in a
specific year as a percentage of total intra-SACU imports. 222 The
excise component is determined as a percentage of the total SACU
217 Protocol Relating to the Application of Compensation for Loss of Revenue
Incurred by ECOWAS Member States as a Result of the Trade Liberalisation Scheme,
May 2002, available at http://www.ehu.es/ceinik/tratados/l I TRATADOSSOBREIN
TEGRACIONYCOOPERACIONENAFRICA/111ECOWAS/IC 11121 .pdf.
218 Protocol Relating to the Assessment of Loss of Revenue by Member States, Nov.
5, 1976, available at http://www.ehu.es/ceinik/tratados/1 TRATADOSSO
BREINTEGRACIONYCOOPERACIONENAFRICA/I1 11 ECOWAS/IC 1113.pdf.
219 Ann. Rep. of the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, ECW/CM!XLIX/2,
Fostering Regional Integration Through NEPAD Implementation, 204 (2002) available
at http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/rapport/es-annual_ report_2002.pdf.
220 2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement art. 34, Oct. 21,
2002, available at http://www.trade.gov.ls/documents/2002%20Southem
%20Afiican%20Customs%20Union.pdf.
221 Id. art. 34(2).
222 Id. art. 34(3)(b).
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gross domestic product in any specific year.223 To achieve some
equitable balance among the SACU members, the distribution of
the development component of SACU, which is funded from fixed
percentages of the excise component,224 is "weighted in favour of
the less developed Member States." '225 The equitable distribution
of SACU's development fund as well as the "generous" system of
compensatory payments that South Africa gives to participant
States has been regarded as an important part of SACU's
success. 226 In addition, SACU has exempted its poorest members,
Swaziland and Lesotho, from the tariff reduction commitments
made by the other members.227
Provisions like this show how small, economically weak states
have sought or demanded accountability from bigger, more
economically advanced states in making decisions on how to
proceed with economic liberalization through RTAs. For
example, Article 5(2) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the
East African Community (EAC) provides that the gains of
cooperation "shall be equitably shared" and that development in
the community shall be "harmonious and balanced., 228  Article
6(e) makes the "equitable distribution of benefits" a fundamental
principle of the community, while Article 7(1)(f) makes the
"equitable distribution of benefits accruing or to be derived from
223 Id. art. 34(4)(b). The Treaty's Annex A provides for the exact methods and
procedure of calculating each State's share of their customs, excise and development
components. See id. at arts. 34(3)(c), 34(4)(c), 34(5)(c).
224 2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement art. 34(5)(a), Oct.
21, 2002, available at http://www.trade.gov.ls/documents/2002%20
Southem%20African%20Customs%20Union.pdf.
225 Id. art. 34(5)(b).
226 POKU, supra note 73, at 89 (also noting that it has been in South Africa's interest
to improve trust among its neighbors since it also creates a market for its producers). But
see Umesh Kumar, Economic Dominance and Dependence: The Case of the Southern
African Customs Union, in JOINING THE FuTuRE: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND CO-
OPERATION IN AFRICA 101 (Oliver Saasa ed., 1991) (quoting from a report conceding that
the "existing SACU provisions failed to fuel economic development" in Botswana,
Lesotho and Swaziland).
227 POKU, supra note 73, at 95.
228 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community art. 5(2), Nov. 30,
1999, 2144 U.N.T.S. 255. Article 5(3)(a) further provides that in pursuance of the
Community's objectives, the members shall ensure "the attainment of sustainable growth
and development of the Partner States by the Promotion of a more balanced and
harmonious development of the Partner States." Id. art. 5(3)(a).
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the operations of the Community and measures to address
economic imbalances that may arise from such operations," an
operational principle of the community. 2 9 The treaty defines
"equitable distribution of benefits" as the "fair and proportionate
distribution of benefits., 23
0
Moreover, the EAC treaty provides for the principles of
variable geometry according to which some members are allowed
to progress in the integration "in various fields and at different
speeds.,231 The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African
Community also recognizes the principle of asymmetry which
allows "variances in implementation of measures in an economic
integration process for purposes of achieving a common
objective,, 232 thus illustrating that flexibility is built right into the
framework of RTAs.233 As we shall see in more detail in the next
section, the East African Court of Justice has recently interpreted
the principle of variable geometry as providing flexibility in
making progress towards integration by allowing activities,
projects and programmes to proceed at different speeds.2 34  The
purpose of this approach is "for the avoidance of internal conflict
and a possible emergence of mistrust among the Partner States,"
so that decisions are not "forced upon an unready Partner just as
refusal or delay of implementation thereof need not be used to
block a ready Partner or Partners.,
235
These types of provisions show the responsiveness of the
integration arrangements to these concerns of inequity. Invariably,
these provisions and decisions influence the degree and patterns of
trade integration, and integration therefore ought not to be
regarded as being effortlessly pursued through binding non-
reversible commitments or as being spurred effortlessly by
technology. Instead, the RTA treaties embed within themselves
229 Id. arts. 6(e), 7(1)(f).
230 See id. art. 1 (interpreting the treaty).
231 See id. art. 7(f).
232 This definition of the principle of asymmetry is contained in Article 1 (1) of the
Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. Id. art. 1(1).
233 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, supra note 228,
art. 7(h).
234 See infra Part III.C.
235 Advisory Opinion Report, supra note 169, at 35.
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accommodations on integration that show sensitivity to how the
gains and losses are shared.
One way of viewing these clauses addressing distributional
equity is as mechanisms of addressing collective action problems
among respective RTA members. They are initiatives aimed at
creating regional coordination and cooperative mechanisms to
overcome collective action problems and prevent free-riding and
domestic political constraints, such as those involving Tanzania's
opposition to joining the East African Common Market which is
addressed in more detail below.236 Of course, they could also
easily be regarded as brakes on trade integration initiatives, but
this would miss the larger point about the importance of these
clauses in rebalancing the unequal costs and benefits that arise
from trade integration opening.
Are redistributive mechanisms a recipe for unequal gains and
what is their effect on integration initiatives? Arthur Hazlewood,
in reflecting on the break-up of the common market arrangements
in East Africa at the end of the 1960s, answered this question
pessimistically when he noted:
["The relative backwardness" of the Ugandan and
Tanzanian economies] would not have neutralized the
disadvantages under which they labored. The dissolution
of the common market, given the small size of the
economies of Tanzania and Uganda, would not have
diverted much industrial development to them from Kenya,
though it would have been likely significantly to reduce the
future rate of industrial growth in East Africa as a whole.Z37
This is the dilemma that economic integration schemes
between countries with highly disparate economic structures face
when they integrate. In East Africa, this problem is now
compounded by the fact that the even smaller and landlocked
economies of Rwanda and Burundi have joined the East African
Community, further exacerbating the relative differences between
poorer and richer countries. The expanding market size resulting
from Rwanda and Burundi becoming members of the East African
Community increases the scope for economies of scale for
efficient industries but may not entirely negate the disparities in
236 See infra Part III.C.
237 HAZLEWOOD, supra note 88, at 67.
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the economy in the East African Community.238 One of the East
African Community's recent initiatives is an East African
Community Development Fund239 which will mobilize resources
from domestic sources and Partner states to finance productive
sectors including energy, transportation and infrastructure.24 °
President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya suggested, upon Rwanda and
Burundi joining the EAC, that the Fund, as well as the enhanced
contributions of the Partner States approved in November 2006,
would help defray the additional cost of running the affairs of the
Community.241 Such an approach in a large measure departs from
the early efforts of attaining a balance of benefits using
redistributive schemes. Instead, it relies on the development of
projects that will promote regional trade.
C. The East African Court of Justice's Variable Geometry
Advisory Opinion
While in the past doubts were expressed about the significance
of trade integration based on market-led integration,242 today there
are clearly efforts and commitments that show that regional
development cooperation is understood as capable of being
undertaken alongside market-led integration, rather than as an
extreme alternative to market-based integration. In the East
African Community, for example, the treaty carefully balances the
238 Byjoining the East African Community in 2005, Rwanda and Burundi increased
the market size to 120 million people. See Rwanda and Burundi Join EAC Customs
Union, E-EAC NEWSLETrER Issue No. 30, at 1 (July 15, 2009), available at
http://www.eac.int/news/index.php?option=comdocman&task=doc-view&gid=48&tmp
l=component&format=raw&Itemid=73.
239 The decision to establish the fund was made by the East African Community
Council of Ministers on August 8th, 2005. See David S.O. Nalo, Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of East African Community on Kenya National Consultation Workshop for the
Study on the Establishment of the East African Community Development Fund,
Statement at the Grand Regency Hotel, at 2 (Oct. 6-7, 2008), available at
www.meac.go.ke (follow "Permanent Secretary's Speeches" hyperlink).
240 Id. at 3.
241 See Biketi Kikechi, Rwanda and Burundi Join the East African Community, E.
AFR. STANDARD (Nairobi), June 19, 2007, available at http://allafrica.com/stories
/200706181801 .html.
242 See Ravenhill, supra note 50, at 48. See also T. Ostergaard, Classical Models of
Regional Integration- What Relevance for Southern Africa?, in SOUTHERN AFRICA AFTER
APARTHEID: REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND EXTERNAL RESOURCES 27 (Bertil Oden ed.,
1993).
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liberalization commitments, on the one hand, with those relating to
equity and distribution among the members, on the other.243 The
East African Court of Justice recently confirmed this in its
advisory opinion on whether the rule on consensus decision
making was inconsistent with the principle of variable geometry
that allows member states flexibility to assume commitments in a
variety of areas at different speeds.2"
This case before the East African Court of Justice arose against
the background of the then ongoing common market negotiations
in the East African Community.24  These negotiations made it
increasingly clear that the five members of the East African
Community were not in agreement on what common market
commitments they were willing to make both as a Community and
as individual members of the Community.2 46  Tanzania, for
example, objected to opening up land ownership to other East
Africans, fearing that it would upset Tanzania's policy against
landlessness by allowing residents of other countries to buy land
there.247 Tanzania also proposed that each member country in the
243 Similarly, the sixth preambular paragraph of South African Customs Union
Agreement notes that the members are mindful of "the different levels of economic
development of the Member States." 2002 Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
Agreement pmbl., Oct. 21, 2002. available at
http://www.trade.gov.ls/documents/2002%20Southem%20African
%20Customs%20Union.pdf.
244 See Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 10 (finding that there is no
conflict between the principle of variable geometry-which allows for phased
implementation of community commitments-and that of consensus in decision making
within the organs of the East African Community).
245 See Treaty Establishing the East African Community, supra note 228, art. 76
(providing the common market as the second stage of integration after the establishment
of a customs union). An East African Community Protocol was signed on November 20,
2009. See Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common
Market, Nov. 20, 2009, available at http://eabc.info/node/410.
246 Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 38. According to the Court, the
context for the Council seeking the advisory opinion emerged because
as integration deepens, different Partner States continue to have differing
attachments to certain policies and their citizens continue to have differing
passions toward such policies. In that environment, understandably, choices
become tougher, decisions become harder and the perceived unanimity
enjoyed in decision making over the years begins to be less forthcoming.
This in our view explains the emergence of this debate at this particular time.
Id.
247 See Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common
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common market retain its own labor laws, further limiting the
adoption of the right of residence, which confers automatic rights
to work anywhere in the East African Community.248
The lack of agreement on the details of the common market
negotiations meant that the Council of Ministers and the Summit
could delay the negotiations until consensus was reached or they
could agree to proceed in a manner that accommodated the
differences. Consequently, the Council of Ministers asked the
EAC Secretariat to seek an advisory opinion on the application of
the principle of variable geometry because, according to the
Council, interpreting variable geometry as permitting progression
of the different activities, projects, and programs at different
speeds, was "contestable on the basis of the fundamental
requirement under the Treaty and relevant annexes for consensus
as a basis for decision-making by the Heads of State and the
Council of Ministers. 249
Under the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African
Community, the Summit250 and Council25' are required to make
decisions by consensus. The Council's request for an advisory
opinion, therefore, posited a conflict between the rule of consensus
decision making, on the one hand, and the principle of variable
geometry, on the other. It sought a ruling from the East African
Court of Justice, which is the principal judicial body of the
Community with jurisdiction to "ensure the adherence to law in
the interpretation and application of and compliance with [the]
Treaty.,252  In addition to the Court having "initial jurisdiction
over the interpretation and application of [the] Treaty, 2 3 it also
has jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions on request from the
Summit, a Partner State, or the Council of Ministers.254
Market, art. 15, supra note 245.
248 Id. Annex II at 3.
249 Council of Ministers, Proposal for Requesting for Advisory Opinion of the East
African Court of Justice (Sept. 13, 2008), reproduced in Advisory Opinion Request,
supra note 169, at 3.
250 Treaty Establishing The East African Community, supra note 228, art. 12(3).
251 Id. art. 15(4). Article 2(1) of the Protocol states which decisions are to be made
by consensus and Article 2(2) specifies which are to be made by majority rule. Id.
252 Id. art. 23.
253 Id. art. 27.
254 Id. art. 36(1).
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The Community asked the court to decide if the treaty's rule of
consensus decision making implied unanimity of all the member
states 2 ' and "whether the principle of variable geometry can apply
to guide the integration process, the requirement on consensus in
decision-making notwithstanding." '256
D. The Arguments of the Partner States and the East African
Law Society as Amici
The Community argued that the outcome will help guide its
process of decision-making, which was critical for its
"institutional development" and would "contribute to the
development of regional jurisprudence as envisioned under
Articles 6, 7 and 126 of the Treaty.,
25 7
According to the Community, variable geometry, an
innovation of European law, allowed "Member States to negotiate
exemptions from certain Treaty provisions and to individually
apply a greater speed on some integration processes than others,
using the institutions and procedures laid down in the Treaty.
2 58
In the Community's view, "variable geometry principles could
considerably ease some of the tensions among sub-regional
integration arrangements in the Community and enhance the
prospect of closer and more regional co-operation. 259
For this reason, the Community supported decisions to be
made by majority rather than by consensus because, this would
allow for agreement among "smaller sub-groups to move faster
,,260 hthan the whole group. In the Community's view, there had
been movement away from consensus decision-making toward
majority decision making within the United Nations and the
European Union. The Community, therefore, argued that the East
African Court of Justice should construe the EAC treaty
255 See Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 6.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. The Community's Counsel also offered the examples of Denmark, Ireland,
and the United Kingdom as countries that opted out of the European Community's
provisions of free movement of persons, asylum, and immigration, respectively. Id. at 7.
259 Id. at 7.
260 Id.
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consistently with this trend.26'
The Community argued that consensus decision making
resulted in delays, was time-consuming, and came with the
dangers of "intransigence" and the possibility of vetoes, which
would allow "individuals or small minorities to block
agreement. 2 62  Rwanda argued that consensus decision-making
and variable geometry did not conflict with each other since each
was designed for different circumstances. 263  For Rwanda, "the
Treaty [gave] no flexibility to some groups" since it required all
the Partner States to "agree on each and every activity.
21
Additionally, Rwanda remarked that the Community was founded
on the "principles of mutual trust, political will and sovereign
equality," as set forth in Article 6(a) of the Treaty, and without
which the Community was in danger of collapsing very much like
the original East African Community.265 As such, according to
Rwanda, the principle of variable geometry allowed groups of
members to engage in activities outside the Community, rather
than within it.2
66
By contrast, Burundi argued that the rule of consensus
decision- making and the principle of variable geometry were not
in harmony based on the practice of the Community.2 67  For
Burundi, "consensus decision-making requires complete
agreement by all Partner States," while variable geometry requires
flexibility in the integration process.268
Kenya argued that the term "consensus" did not necessarily
261 See Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 7.
262 Id. at 8. In addition, the Community argued that the increase of members from
three to five increased the susceptibility to disruption, with small groups obstructing the
others. In this manner, the Community argued, consensus decision-making could
"reward the least accommodating group members while punishing the most
accommodating." Id. at 9. According to the Community, consensus decision-making can
result in the Abilene Paradox, where a group unanimously agrees on a course of action
no single member wants, "because no one individual is willing to go against the
perceived will of the decision-making body." Id. at 9.
263 See id. at 10.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 11.
267 Id. at 12.
268 Id.
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equate to unanimity as Burundi had contended.26 9 Kenya argued
that the practice in the European Community was to permit
members "to opt out of unwanted policies rather than being
obliged to choose between vetoing them or accepting a majority
verdict.""27  Consensus decision making and variable geometry,
Kenya argued, could co-exist as long as the sphere and scope of
the operation of each could be clearly defined.27" ' According to
Kenya:
[V]ariable geometry . . . permits Member States in a
regional integration arrangement to pursue integration at
different levels in different fields/policy areas, so long as
the enhanced integration contributes to enhancing
integration in the regional integration arrangements, and
does not create a barrier to trade or discriminate among
Member States.272
Thus while Kenya supported variable geometry, it argued that
if the policy allowed countries to cherry pick their favorite policies
and create smaller groups of similarly-minded countries, there was
a danger that "some fundamental policies will not be addressed by
some Member States. 2 73  The question of multiple and
overlapping memberships in African RTAs will be discussed in
Part IV below.
For Kenya, therefore, the role of the Court in issuing the
advisory opinion was to clarify what the Treaty refers to as
consensus decision-making because such uncertainty was slowing
down the integration process. 274 According to Kenya:
[E]ach country has a different rate of economic growth,
different socio-economic factors and varying national
policies that it takes into consideration when deciding
whether or not to vote in favour of a specific proposal ....
[V]ariable geometry is an important principle that operates
side by side with consensus decision making as it
accommodates each country's unique features and that as
269 Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 12-13.
270 Id. at 14.
271 Id. at 15.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 16.
274 See Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 16.
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such it should be embraced by the Community and not
ignored by forcing States to adopt blanket proposals which
may not be best suited to their interests.275
Thus Kenya sought guidance from the Court as to whether
consensus decision making required unanimity, a two-thirds
majority, or a simple majority, because this would "eliminate
confusion and uncertainty in the future. 276
Tanzania, like Rwanda and Burundi, argued that consensus
decision making under the Treaty meant unanimity.277 It believed
that such an interpretation was supported by provisions in the
treaty on consensus decision-making because "the stark reality"
recognized in the treaty "that each Partner is a Sovereign State and
that in the Partner States' peaceful co-existence, mutual trust is of
the essence., 278 For Tanzania, the Partner States had designed the
treaty, (as recognized in the operational principles in Article 7 and
the fundamental principles in Article 6), in order to have a "single
voice, notwithstanding their variables in terms of sizes or stages of
development. 2 79 Tanzania also argued that such an interpretation
was consistent with "the dual mandate of the leaderships of the
Partner States to the people they represent on the one hand and to
the Community on the other [which in Tanzania's view] demands
that the leaderships and their people be heard and their positions
respected.,28" Tanzania also objected to the request for an
advisory opinion since a treaty amendment had been initiated
through the political process by the Sectoral Committee on Legal
and Judicial Affairs to clarify how variable geometry and
consensus decision-making were related.28' Seeking an advisory
opinion from the Court, Tanzania argued, removed the question
from the political process, "where the matter belongs," and as such
the request for an advisory opinion was "an abuse of the process of
the court."28 2 The Court rejected this argument.283
275 Id. at 16-17.
276 Id. at 16.
277 Id. at 20.
278 Id. at 19.
279 Id.
280 Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 19.
281 Id. at 20.
282 Id.
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Uganda also shared the view that the question of the proper
relationship between consensus decision-making and variable
geometry belonged to the political amendment process.28 Uganda
argued that the question before the Court was whether the organs
of the Community could make decisions using variable
geometry.285 For Uganda, variable geometry "would allow each
country to pace changes brought about in the Treaty at a speed and
course that meets and fits unique local conditions of each specific
Partner State., 28 6  The two principles could not, according to
Uganda, be put alongside each other because one had to first
"decide on a policy or objective before arriving at variable
geometry which has to take account of practical realities in the
different Partner States on the mode and speed of implementation
of the policy. '287  In essence, Uganda was suggesting that the
question before the court was a non-justiciable political matter
within the sovereign prerogatives of the partner states.288
The East African Law Society argued that flexible geometry
permitted "flexibility in the integration process and
progression in the East African Community activities by some
Partner States and not all., 289  The East African Law Society
contended that there was not much merit to the claim that
decisions not in accordance with consensus decision-making as
required by the treaty could be challengeable if made by applying
the principle of variable geometry. 29° The Society maintained that
in the European Union, differentiation in the integration structure
was permissible to accommodate irreconcilable differences,
permitting "a permanent separation between a group of Partner
283 Id. at 41. ("The process of amending the Treaty reported to be underway in the
Executive Organs of the Community, as well as this Application for an Advisory
Opinion are perfectly compatible. The application was brought to this court on a
directive of the Council, the very organ reported to be overseeing the said amendment. It
was properly brought and the Court has jurisdiction.")
284 Id. at 23.
285 Id.
286 Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 22.
287 Id.
288 According to Uganda, the question was one for "the governing bodies and
administrators of the East African Community," but not for the Court. Id. at 23.
289 Id. at 24.
290 Id.
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States and a number of less developed integration units., 291 The
Society reasoned that variable geometry was a "flexible and
pragmatic approach to integration" that allowed countries to
proceed on the integration agenda based on the extent of their
interest. 292  As such, variable geometry applied because of
differences in sizes, priorities, and levels of political and economic
development, as well as in culture and language, "which make it
difficult for members to meet the criteria for membership at the
same speeds and depths., 293 The Society argued that the principle
of variable geometry and the rule of consensus decision making
were not necessarily inconsistent with each other, and therefore,
the Court could advise the partner states to amend the treaty and
related protocols "to provide for application of the principle of
variable geometry in specific areas of activity.9
2 94
Based on these submissions, it is clear that Kenya favored a
rapid progression of the Community into a common market much
more readily than Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi which
interpreted the consensus decision making as requiring unanimity.
E. The Decision of the Court
The Court began by noting that the two issues it had to decide
were, first, whether the principle of variable geometry was in
harmony with the rule of consensus decision-making, and second,
whether the principle of variable geometry could be applied to
guide the process of integration, notwithstanding the requirement
of consensus decision-making .295 The Court noted that the treaty
defined the principle of variable geometry, but provided no
definition of consensus. It therefore proceeded to develop a
definition from extraneous sources.296 Surprisingly, the Court first
resorted to Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 297  This online
source is hardly recommendable for an authoritative dictionary
291 Id.
292 Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 25.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 27.
295 Id. at 28.
296 Id.
297 Id. at 29; see Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited February 9,
2010).
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meaning of any word.
According to the Court, "[c]onsensus as applied in the Treaty
and Protocols . . . is purely and simply a decision-making
mechanism in Summit, Council and in the other executive organs
of the Community while variable geometry as used therein is a
strategy for implementation." '298 The Court then distinguished
between decisions consistent with the objectives of the Treaty,
where "the basis for making the decision is consensus," with the
implementation of the decision.2 99 It is in the implementation of
decisions that "the practical realities such as the vital national
interests, the negotiations, the give and take of consultations that
each Partner State will inevitably have to take care of for the good
of the Partner State and ultimately that of the Community.' '3°
Notably, the Court did not give any basis at all in the treaty or the
EAC's protocols for this distinction between decision and
implementation.3"' This is not to suggest there could be no such
basis, but the Court did not try to establish any at all.
Based on this distinction between decision and
implementation, the Court found consistency between the
principle of variable geometry and the rule of consensus decision
making.30 2  This consistency was established by noting that
consensus in decision-making is a "suitable operational principle,
which may well be variable geometry ... to govern the practical
implementation of that particular decision.'3 3 Thus, establishing
the distinction between decision and implementation from the
outset, the Court proceeded to find that both are different stages in
a single process, except that variable geometry is not always the
implementation choice if there are no considerations such as those
necessitating differentiated implementation of a decision.3 4
As had been agreed before the Court by the Partner States and
the amicus East African Law Society, the court noted that the
298 Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 30.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id. ("It is the court's opinion that decisions in... the community are made with
two aspects in mind. (emphasis added)).
302 Id.
303 Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 30.
304 Id.
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considerations relevant to identifying how variable geometry
squares with consensus decision making are tailored as ways to
accommodate countries intent on proceeding with integration
decisions that may not be uniformly shared. From this perspective,
variable geometry was, therefore, a strategy for accommodating
countries that are unable to proceed with certain integration
decisions." 5 This definition of variable geometry adopted by the
Court and used by the Partner States is consistent with
accommodating laggard Partner States. In essence, variable
geometry gets a very positive spin-it is a policy of allowing
forward movement without compelling unwilling countries to do
so. One alternative that the Court did not accept, and in fact
explicitly rejected, is to require unanimity for consensus decision-
making. By excluding this possibility of the meaning of
consensus, it becomes possible to reconcile variable geometry
with the rule of consensus decision-making.3 6 As a result, the
Court neatly integrates variable geometry and consensus decision-
making into a single process:
Partner States may agree on implementation at different
speeds due to different readiness levels or different
priorities, some may choose or opt out of implementation
altogether due to national realities, yet others may decide
to 'opt out' and at a future time they will "opt in". All
these will be agreed by the Partner States, by consensus.30 7
In addition, the Court also held "that the principle of variable
geometry .. . is a strategy of implementation of Community
decisions and not a decision making tool in itself."3 °8  This is
consistent with Article 7 of the treaty, which provides that the
treaty's operational principles "'shall govern the practical
achievement of the objectives of the Community .... ,,,309 The
Court found that "the principle of variable geometry has been
internationally applied to deepen integration,"3"0 and gave the
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 30.
308 Id. at 34.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 31.
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examples of SADC, the European Union,311 and the "Provisions of
Enhanced Cooperation" of the Treaty of the European Union.312
The Court recommended that the East African Community "study,
and possibly emulate some of the examples of application of these
concepts to deepen integration." '313
Of course, if the only meaning of variable geometry available
was that of allowing countries willing to proceed with integration
to move forward rather than be held back, the Court is right. Yet,
it is not entirely clear that variable geometry is necessarily a win-
win for deeper integration if laggard States can avoid proceeding
with implementation of deeper integration measures. Variable
geometry is as much a framework for allowing a group of like-
minded states to proceed with certain integration initiatives as it is
for objecting states to opt-out of time-tabled integration
commitments when the decision to assume the commitments and
begin implementation arrives.
That is why the Court advised the Community to consider
using variable geometry "as an exception, not as the rule, as
indeed institutionalized flexibility might lead to break-up of the
Community or its transformation into 'a mere free trade area,"' as
contemplated by the provisions of Article 43(b) of the Treaty of
the European Union.1 4 The Court also recommended that the East
African Community borrow from the European Union the idea of
a set of "core and periphery" obligations which would require
members to determine areas over which variable geometry could
311 The Court referenced the 1985 EU Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Schengen
Convention in which Ireland and the United Kingdom opted out of and "retained their
"national border controls on the movement of persons from other EU member states." Id.
Another example is the EU Economic and Monetary Union, from which Ireland and the
United Kingdom have opted out, and the EU Social Policy Agreement from which the
United Kingdom has opted out. See id. at 31-32.
312 Id. at 33-34. The "Provisions of Enhanced Cooperation" in the Treaty of the
European Union are contained in Articles 43 and 43(b), Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, arts.
43 and 43(b), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
313 Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 34.
314 Id. at 34. Article 43(b) of the European Union Treaty provides: "Enhanced
cooperation may be undertaken only as a last resort, when it has been established within
the Council that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a
reasonable period by applying relevant provisions of the Treaty." Id.
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and could not apply.3"5
In conclusion, the Court held:
[F]or avoidance of internal conflict and a possible
emergence of mistrust among the Partner States, and in
accordance with the Treaty provisions above discussed,
decisions should be taken with the above two aspects in
mind [variable geometry and consensus decision-making]
and simultaneous implementation thereof need not be
forced upon an unready Partner just as refusal or delay of
implementation thereof need not be used to block a ready
Partner or Partners.316
In so doing, the Court avoided giving States skeptical of
progressing into the common market stage of East African
cooperation a reason to derail the commitment of those states that
support this transition to a common market. The Court then
expressed the view, which it also noted was shared in the
submissions before it, "that the problems associated with obtaining
consensus" arose from the hesitation to make certain decisions,
rather than a rejection of such decisions.317 Indeed, according to
the Court, a rejection of a decision consistent with the treaty was
not possible since it "would be tantamount to a rejection of a
particular treaty provision. ' The hesitation seemed to arise from
the requirement that decisions needed simultaneous
implementation by all Partner States.3 19 Yet, according to the
Court:
Simultaneous implementation is impracticable in some
circumstances and Partner States cannot be expected to
operate within such strait jacket or one size fits all
situations. Variable geometry is, therefore, intended, and
actually allows, those Partner States who cannot implement
a particular decision simultaneously or immediately to
implement it at a suitable certain future time or simply at a
different speed while at the same time allowing those who
315 Id.
316 Id. at 35.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 See Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169, at 35.
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are able to implement immediately to do so.32°
The Court cited Judge Tanaka in the 1966 ICJ Reports to the
effect that "to treat unequal matters differently according to their
inequality is not only permitted but required."32' In this manner,
the Court found that consensus was required under the Treaty for
arriving at Community decisions, but that variable geometry
played a role "in deciding the implementation of the
programme." '322 It also found that the term "consensus decision-
making" was not defined in the Treaty for the Establishment of the
East African Community or in Community Protocols.323 Thus,
rather than equate the term with unanimity, the Court
recommended amending the Community's instruments.324
Notably, the Court and those that appeared before it did not
address the related principle of asymmetry under the Treaty for the
Establishment of the East African Community.325 This principle
allows member states to vary "the implementation of measures in
an economic integration process for purposes of achieving a
common objective., 326  It would seem that there is a close
relationship between the principles of variable geometry and that
of asymmetry to the extent that both allow variation in
implementation timetables, yet the Court did not allude to it.327 In
fact, the Court did not necessarily have to refer to examples from
the European Union; it could have looked at the East African
Customs Union Protocol, which already incorporates the
principles of variable geometry and asymmetry by virtue of the
320 Id.
321 Id. at 36 (quoting South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, 306
(July 18) (Tanaka, J., dissenting)).
322 Id.
323 In particular, the Court rejected the argument that Article 148 of the Treaty for
the Establishment of the East African Community could be construed as implying "that
consensus is synonymous with unanimity." Id. at 40.
324 Id. at 38.
325 See Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169. See infra note 228 and
accompanying text.
326 This definition is provided in Article 1(1) of the Treaty for the Establishment of
the East African Community. The principle is provided as an operational principle of the
treaty in Article 7(h). The East African Community Treaty, Nov. 30, 1999, available at:
http://www.eac.int (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
327 See Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169.
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variation in the tariff reduction schedule.328 While the Customs
Union Protocol urges member states to eliminate all internal tariffs
and similar charges on trade among the Partner States upon the
entry into force of the Protocol,3 29 it nevertheless gives Uganda
and Tanzania more favorable tariff removal commitments than
those given to the more economically developed Kenya under
other provisions. For example, Article 11(2) provides that as
between Uganda and Tanzania, goods are duty-free,33 and goods
from Uganda and Tanzania into Kenya are duty-free.33' However,
Kenyan goods do not enjoy such duty-free treatment in Uganda
and Tanzania.332 Article 11(3) provides for the categorization of
goods from Kenya into Uganda and Tanzania.33 3 This section sets
out two categories of goods-Category A goods, which are
"eligible for immediate duty free treatment," and Category B
goods, which are "eligible for gradual tariff reduction. 334 Further,
Category B goods from Kenya into Uganda will have a five-year
phase-out tariff reduction period for all products.33' This phase-
out tariff reduction period begins by 10% during the first year, 8%
during the second, 6% during the third, 4% during the fourth, and
2% during the fifth.336 Additionally, Category B goods from
Kenya into Tanzania have a similar phase-out tariff reduction
period.337 The underlying requirement is that no internal tariff can
exceed the common external tariff with respect to any of the
specified products. 33' The differentiation in the tariff schedules
advantage Uganda and Tanzania pursuant to the principle of
328 See Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union, Nov. 30,
1999, available at http://www. eac.int/eac-tenders/docdetails/154-eac-customs-union-
protocol.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
329 Id. art. 10(1).
330 Id. art. 1l(2)(a).
331 Id. art. 11(2)(b).
332 Id. art. 11(3).
333 Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union, supra note
328, at art. 11(3).
334 Id. art. 1i(3)(a) and (b).
335 Id. art. 11(4). Category B goods include agricultural products, building
materials, plastics, wood, paper, textiles, iron, steel, and other manufactured goods. Id.
336 Id. art. 11(4).
337 Id. art. 11(5).
338 Id. art. 11(6).
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variable geometry.
In any event, the EACJ's variable geometry decision is a
highly significant decision because it provides an existing route
within the Treaty framework for states like Tanzania which are
deeply suspicious that they will be economically disadvantaged by
relatively more economically powerful states like Kenya.339 The
principle of variable geometry has given states like Tanzania a
legal foothold within the East African Community not to make
commitments that they believe will unfairly distribute rewards.
For those states willing to continue in the common market stage of
the integration process, the decision also provides a legal basis for
their continued cooperation since objecting states will not be
regarded as wielding a veto under the rule of consensus decision-
making, but rather as exercising their right to opt out of
commitments under the principle of variable geometry. This
flexibility, as noted before, is a central feature of second
generation African RTAs.340
F. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Variable Geometry
Having seen how African RTAs have adopted various versions
of variable geometry and discussed the EACJ's variable geometry
decision, it is now time to briefly and preliminarily evaluate the
effectiveness of these measures. To do so, a variety of baselines
could be used. One obvious point of departure is whether these
measures promote or undermine trade liberalization, a question
that is addressed in greater length in the discussion of multiple
memberships in RTAs in Part IV below. Another is whether these
measures nudge countries that would otherwise not adopt even
minimal liberalization commitments to do so. Finally, one may
ask whether variable geometry plays a non-economic role in
encouraging integration. This section addresses each of these in
turn.
Variable geometry, especially as phased implementation that
allows some countries to remain behind while others proceed to
339 See Advisory Opinion Request, supra note 169; James Thuo Gathii, Kenya: Spat
With Dar Over Trade, Bus. DAILY (Nairobi), Feb. 4, 2008, available at
http://multimedia.marsgroupkenya.org/ ?StorylD =211243&page=4. See also infra
notes 175-189 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical tension between
Tanzania and Kenya.
340 See discussion infra pp.577-9.
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higher levels of trade integration, slows down trade liberalization.
Therefore, the question is whether the increased levels of
integration with minimal variable geometry are better than no
liberalization at all. The answer to this question is complicated by
the fact that variable geometry also involves paying off countries
that lose from gains made by other member states as well as the
preferential access to capital in regional development banks.341
From this perspective, variable geometry can only confidently be
argued to primarily serve goals other than encouraging deeper
trade integration.
Clearly, some measures of variable geometry are indispensable
in encouraging countries to participate in integration schemes, but
they may not necessarily encourage deeper liberalization than a
beneficiary country is likely to undertake in the absence of such
measures of accommodation. This is clearly the case of Tanzania
in the East African Community. From this perspective, variable
geometry helps to build trust and confidence among members
whose benefits from integration are likely to be rather lopsided,
rather than to necessarily nudge liberalization otherwise not
possible.
Variable geometry stands in sharp contrast to the premise of
the global trading regime which punishes defections from the rules
under a sanctions regime backed up by a compulsory and binding
dispute settlement system. African RTAs have yet to threaten
sanctions against one another where there has been non-
compliance with liberalization commitments.342
341 See, e.g., Lucio Castro et al., Regional Integration in East Africa, Regional
Trade Integration in East Africa: Trade and Revenue Impacts of the Planned East
African Community Customs Union (World Bank Africa Region Working Paper Series
No. 72, Aug. 29, 2004) (arguing that a compensation fund may be needed to address the
cost/benefit imbalances among East African Community members because Kenyan
exporters disproportionately benefited from economic linkages under the East African
Customs Union).
342 For example, while COMESA has granted Kenya safeguards for its sugar and
wheat produce, COMESA member countries have not threatened retaliatory sanctions
against Kenya for imposing an auction for sugar import licenses that caused COMESA
members like Egypt and Swaziland to lose market share in the Kenyan sugar market.
Instead, in September 2009, COMESA sent a Sugar Sector Safeguard Assessment
Mission to Kenya which recommended removal of the auctioning of import licenses for
sugar. Following this recommendation, Kenya removed this auction system for sugar
license imports. See Kenya Cancels Auction of Sugar Import Rights, REUTERS, Mar. 10,
2010, available at
2010]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
So what are the benefits of collaboration and cooperation
under RTAs that are characterized by variable geometry measures
in the absence of coercive mechanisms? African RTAs are only
beginning to provide avenues of increased transparency and
openness in regional trade in ways that are particularly useful in
breaking down the especially high tariff and non-tariff barriers to
regional trade in Africa. They are also beginning to provide
regional checks on domestic interest groups and industries that are
opposed to trade liberalization.343 However, these benefits are still
in their infancy in terms of becoming a reality on the ground. In
the meantime, variable geometry remains one of the most visible
features of African RTAs today. As argued throughout this paper,
variable geometry is one of the most important features that
demonstrates the flexibility of African RTAs.
IV. Multiple Memberships in RTAs
Part IV will examine another important feature of the
flexibility of African RTAs-multiple memberships. Of the fifty-
one countries in Africa, only six belong to only one RTA.3" The
other forty-five belong to at least two or more RTAs.345 Swaziland
belongs to three RTAs-COMESA, SADC and SACU.3 46 Of all
five countries in the EAC, four are also members of COMESA,
http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE6270CP20100308. See also John
Okuye, COMESA Likely to Petition Kenya Over Safeguards on Sugar, E. AFR.
STANDARD (Nairobi), Dec. 1, 2009, available at
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=l 144029312&cid=457&.
343 Id. Following COMESA's recommendation that Kenya remove the auction of
import license for sugar, the Kenyan sugar industry declared that it would be ready to
compete with duty free sugar from the COMESA region when the COMESA safeguards
ended in 2012. See Walter Menya, Sugar Industry in Bitter Wars Ahead of COMESA
Date, Bus. DAILY (Nairobi), Apr. 30, 2009, at 12, available at
http://multimedia.marsgroupkenya.org/?StorylD=253746&page=4 (citing Dr. Evans
Kidero, Chairman of the Kenya Sugarcane Millers Association). For an analysis of the
variety of roles interest groups have played in the East African Community from a liberal
inter-governmentalism perspective, see Mwita Chacha, The New Community: Liberal
Intergovemmentalism and East Africa Integration (Sept. 2009) (American Political
Science Association Paper), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1449277.
344 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, supra note 44.
345 See infra Figures 1-4.
346 See infra Figure 1.
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while Tanzania is a member of SADC.34 7 Of the fifteen countries
in SADC, eight are also members of COMESA.3 48  Figures 1
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Figure 4: Overlapping Memberships in
ECOWAS/CENSAD/UEMOA/WAMZ
Overlapping memberships in several RTAs is a reflection of
the large number of bilateral and regional trade agreements, an
occurrence that Jagdish Bhagwati has referred to as the "spaghetti
bowl." '349  This part of the paper examines multiplicity of
memberships and the variety of regional trade agreements as a
further illustration of the thesis of this paper-that African RTAs
are flexible regimes. This part of the paper also examines the
349 Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation With Free Trade Areas, in
THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 2 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1995). (According to Bhagwati, the "spaghetti bowl"
phenomenon results when countries and intergovemmental organizations enter into
multiple criss-crossing, instead of participating in multilateral trade.). See also generally
Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 39 (2006).
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extent to which this multiplicity of memberships and trade
agreements has contributed to the "spaghetti bowl," which is
addressed in further detail below.
Multiple memberships in RTAs is a reflection of the character
of African RTAs as flexible regimes. This does not understate or
underestimate the criticisms of multiple memberships. These
criticisms can be divided into two main categories. The first
relates to the fact that multiplicity of memberships in RTAs is a
reflection of the undesirable proliferation of RTAs in creating a
spaghetti bowl. A second category of criticisms relates to the high
transaction costs and administrative difficulties of complying with
multiple Rules of Origin (RoOs).35° Multiple memberships also
prevent African governments from focusing on a single regional
economic bloc, diminishing the little trade capacity and budgets of
these countries. In addition, jurisdictional uncertainty arises as a
result of overlapping legal regimes.
This part first examines the reasons accounting for multiple
memberships in African RTAs and how multiple memberships are
a reflection of Africa's diversity. It then examines criticisms of
the multiplicity of memberships in African RTAs. The final part,
which is also the penultimate section of the paper, addresses the
spaghetti bowl critique of the multiplicity of RTAs.
A. Why Countries Have Multiple Memberships in RTAs
Multiple memberships reflect the desire of countries to pick
and choose various options offered by competing RTAs.35" '
Different RTAs offer benefits to members beyond providing the
reduction or removal of tariff barriers and the harmonization of
trade policies like customs policies."' For example, the
350 Rules of Origin (RoOs) specify when a product will qualify for duty-free
movement within the RTA, what proportion of value must be added if it originates
within the trade bloc, or whether it is required that a product undergo a substantial
transformation in a country before being allowed to cross the border duty free. For
more on rules of origin, see infra notes 447 to 458 and accompanying text.
351 See Arvind Panagariya, The Regionalism Debate: An Overview, 22 WORLD
ECONOMY 477, 500 (1999) ("Even in the absence of any increase in trade barriers against
nonmembers, the proliferation of crisscrossing FTAs leads to a replacement of the
nondiscriminatory MFN tariff by a spaghetti bowl whereby tariffs vary according to the
ostensible origin of the product.").
352 See Powers, supra note 82, at 3-4.
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international transportation of commodities through waterways in
Africa developed because the continent has the largest river basin
coverage in the world.353 Since waterways do not divert or
conform to the signing and changing climate of trade agreements,
the use and rights of these waterways that span through multiple
free trade areas requires cooperation between RTAs and offers an
important reason for multiple trade bloc membership. Multiple
trade bloc membership gives member countries access to aquatic
trade routes that would otherwise be unavailable to them. This
contributes to the diversification of agreements by landlocked
countries, since transport costs limit competitiveness.354 As a
result, Africa's landlocked countries and the coastal nations they
border are members of the same RTAs, sharing ports and trade
routes.355 Water basin states, in fact, often share membership in
more than one RTA, and some RTAs overlap in the basins that
they manage.356
African RTAs, therefore, serve as institutions of basin
management demonstrating "the entwined relationships among
trade, environment, and security aspects of international river
basins."3 7 From this perspective RTAs are trade-plus institutions
to the extent to which trade is linked to environmental issues as
well as to security issues.358  In short, natural resource
management and water cooperation on the one hand are
interwoven with trade and security on the other.359 Indeed, Part
One examined how African RTAs nestle within them a variety of
non-trade objectives and institutions.
Another major benefit of multiple memberships in RTAs is the
ability to shift lawmaking initiatives from one international venue
another that offers different advantages. This is referred to as
353 Id. at 16.
354 Nick Charalambides, The Private Sector's Perspective, Priorities and Role in
Regional Integration and Implications for Regional Trade Arrangements 10 (ECDPM,
Discussion Paper No. 66, 2005).
355 Yongzheng Yang & Sanjeev Gupta, Regional Trade Arrangements in Africa:
Past Performance and the Way Forward 9 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/05/36, 2005).
356 See Powers, supra note 82, at 18.
357 Id. at 11.
358 Id. at 25.
359 Id.
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regime-shifting.36 According to Laurence Heifer, "the existence
of multiple, discrete regimes, any one of which may plausibly
serve as a site for future policy development, leaves considerable
room for maneuvering by different clusters of states (or states and
NGOs) seeking to maximize their respective interests. 3 61 On this
argument, countries enter into regimes to reduce the transaction
costs and information problems that plague uncoordinated state
relations.362 A few examples are necessary to illustrate this point
more fully in the African RTA context.
At present, Kenya is a member of both COMESA and the
EAC.363 Some benefits that Kenya accrues under COMESA, are
currently unavailable under the EAC.36 COMESA gives Kenya
the opportunity to protect its economy against dumping, as it has
done in the case of sugar and wheat exports, which Kenya has
sought and obtained.3 65 The EAC does not currently offer Kenya
that important possibility.3 66  In addition, COMESA offers a
broader group of countries from which Kenya can defend itself
against unfair trade practices than does the EAC.3 67 The EAC also
has advantages that COMESA does not give Kenya.3 68  For
example, the EAC provides a closer regional proximity with
Kenya's immediate and near neighbors than does the expansive
COMESA region that spans to Egypt in North Africa.3 69 In short,
there are things Kenya can better achieve in one regional bloc than
360 See Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 5
n.17 (2004) (explaining that the term international "regime" refers to the principles,
norms, and rules governing a particular issue area of international relations and the
institutional structures and decision-making procedures through which they are
developed.) Helfer also explains that regimes are formed when the interests of states
converge around certain shared objectives that can best be achieved through interstate
cooperation. Id.
361 Id. at 8.
362 Id. at 7.
363 East African Community-Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi,
http://www.eac.int/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2010).
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in another regional bloc.
During the latter stages of South Africa's apartheid era, SACU
was comprised of Botswana, Lesotho, Nairobi (which became a
member upon its independence in 1990), and Swaziland (BLNS);
as well as South Africa.37° As part of a customs union, these
countries enjoyed a higher level of economic integration than
would be found in either a preferential trade area (PTA) or a free
trade area (FTA).37" ' However, rather than being an organization
based on interdependence and mutual cooperation, SACU was a
direct reflection of the high level of dependence of the BLNS
countries on South Africa.31 2  Geographic and economic factors
such as shared boundaries, interlinked transportation, and
employment exemplified this dependant relationship.373  This
dependency was the root of much conflict due to South Africa's
maintenance of a white-minority government.374  Geographic
proximity and integration economically prevented BLNS from
breaking off ties fully with South Africa, even though the BLNS
countries repeatedly denounced South Africa's apartheid
system.375 While the BLS countries were strongly opposed to the
South African form of government and the dominant role South
Africa played in their economies, it was not in their best interests
to take an extreme position against South Africa as it might have
crippled them economically.376 The other problem the BLNS
countries faced was that South Africa's apartheid government not
only alienated itself from a number of international organizations,
but also resulted in the rejection of SACU as a whole.377 The
370 Robert D.A. Henderson, The Southern African Customs Union: Politics of
Dependence, in THE FUTURE OF REGIONALISM IN AFRICA 225, 225 (Ralph I. Onwuka &
Amadu Sesay eds., 1985).
371 Id. at 226.
372 Id. at 239.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 241.
375 See id. at 238 (by explaining that the BLNS countries are open to South African
economic pressure being dependent on South Africa for a large portion of their
government revenue in the form of shares from the common customs pool, manufactured
goods and food, and wage employment).
376 See id. at 241 (stating that any attempt to impose economic sanctions against
South Africa would certainly result in serious economic disruption within the BLNS
countries as well as certain neighboring countries as well).
377 The best example of the BLNS countries joining others in the region in rejecting
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result of this was an increasing effort on the part of the BLNS
countries to lessen their dependency on South Africa gradually by
exploring other economic options.378 This was referred to as
"gradual disengagement," and led to the BLNS contingency
joining other economic affiliations such as SADCC.379 The
resulting multiple memberships of the BLNS countries was not
intended to directly compete with South Africa or BLNS's
obligations with SACU, but rather to complement the goal of
making these countries more economically independent, and less
dependent on a country denounced by the world for its racist
policies.38 °
In West Africa, he Communate Economique de l'Afrique de
l'Ouest (CEAO) and ECOWAS offer another example of the
historical reasons for multiple memberships.38' CEAO was an
economic grouping that carried over from the colonial period,
while ECOWAS was created in an effort to cut across cultural and
linguistic barriers.382 Instead of abandoning one in favor of the
other because they both were based on the same principles, the
members of CEAO agreed to join ECOWAS while being able to
retain their membership in CEAO.383 The economic dominance of
Nigeria is very similar to South Africa's dominance in the
previous example.384 However, Nigeria's dominance had the
opposite effect of drawing members into ECOWAS instead of
pushing them away as South Africa had done. 85
South Africa's dominance of SACU is the Lusaka Declaration. See Southern Africa
Development Coordination Conference [SADCC], Southern Africa: Towards Economic
Liberation: A Declaration by the Governments of Independent Africa Made at Lusaka on
the s t of April 1980, in RECORD OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATION SUMMIT CONFERENCE 35 (Lusaka, 1980).
378 See Henderson, supra note 370, at 243-44.
379 Id.
380 See id. at 244 & n.44.
381 S.K.B. Asante, ECOWAS/CEAO: Conflict and Cooperation in West Africa, in
THE FUTURE OF REGIONALISM IN AFRICA 74, 78 (Ralph I. Onwuka & Amadu Sesay eds.,
1985).
382 Id. at 75-76.
383 Id. at 78.
384 Id. See also Rugumamu, supra note 174.
385 See id. at 82 & n.13 (citing John Ravenhill, who observed that Nigeria's
presence in ECOWAS allows it to sustain existing integrative arrangements and to
extend into new areas of cooperation).
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These examples show that in some cases, multiple
memberships were anticipated from the beginning. In such cases,
changing political, social, and economic environments play a
major role in multiple memberships. These examples add to one
of the central claims of this paper, that African RTAs are trade-
plus regimes that reflect a broad set of goals and are not simply
trade treaties. Seeing African RTAs as regimes adds to the
argument that countries that are members of more than one RTA
may well regard treaties establishing RTAs as providing a
framework for cooperation, but not necessarily as treaties creating
binding obligations.386 For these countries, multiple memberships
in RTAs offers them flexibility and adaptability to member states
since they can retain their sovereignty and accrue benefits from
multiple regimes otherwise not available through sole
memberships.
B. Multiple Memberships Reflect Africa's Diversity
As noted earlier in this paper, regionalism in Africa is often
regarded as necessary to aggregate bargaining power to negotiate
with powerful trading partners like the European Union.387 While
this argument has much merit and ought not to be downplayed, it
presumes that unity in regionalism can overcome the variety of
ways in which African countries are divided. Indeed, presuming
that African unity through regionalism is easily achievable is
based upon "certain sociological, cultural and psychological
affinities already identified" and "conceives of Africa's foreign
policy as being singular and consensual." '388 Further, such a view
presumes that for Africa's voice to be heard in the world trade
arena, it must be unified through ".externalization' for continental
integration as well as extra continental effectiveness."38 9  Yet
while the hope of unity for these purposes would ideally serve
Africa well, the search for African unity and regional integration
has proven very daunting. Multiple memberships reflect the
reality of diversity among African countries and the complexity of
their conflicting, overlapping, and sometimes congruent
386 See Helfer, supra note 360, at 10 & n.20.
387 See supra note 183 (referencing Vaitsos, supra note 14, at 729-36).
388 Shaw, supra note 96, at 13.
389 Id.
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interests. ° In fact, as William Zartman, a leading Africanist, has
argued:
The recognition of overlapping systems in interpreting
foreign policy alternatives and possibilities for states with
dual membership is both a more helpful and more realistic
way of looking at foreign policies than is the attempt to
force such states exclusively into one area or the other. 9'
Zartman's support for overlapping systems for African
countries espoused several decades ago continues to have
relevance today. Consider, for example, how some African States
have recently defected from signing Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union (EU) in their
designated regional groupings.392  For example, non-least
developed countries (LDCs)3 93 in ECOWAS decided to go it alone
and signed their own EPA with the EU.3 94 In addition, Ghana and
Cote D'Ivoire, two of the three non-LDCs, signed interim EPAs
under pressure from the EU, thus further deepening the wedge
among ECOWAS member states. 395  ECOWAS LDCs were
concerned that signing an EPA with the EU would allow Nigeria
to become a conduit for channeling goods originating from Europe
into their economies.3 96 Thus, differing interests among ECOWAS
members resulted in multiplying the number of EPAs the EU was
390 See infra Part W.A.
391 1. William Zartman, Africa as a Subordinate State in International Relations,
2(3) INT'L ORG. 581 (Summer 1967). See also William Lyakurwa et al., Regional
Integration in Southern Africa: A Review of Experiences and Issues, in REGIONAL
INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA: FRAMEWORK ISSUES
AND METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 196 (A. Oyejide et al., ed., 1997).
392 Ken Akaoha, ECOWAS EPA-The Facts and the Fallacies (Jan. 21, 2008),
available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id-article=1 0985.
393 "Least developed country" is a term of art used by the United Nations to describe
countries which exhibit the lowest levels of socioeconomic development. See OFFICE OF
THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES, Least Developed
Countries: Criteria for Identification of LDCs, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/59/
(explaining the criteria by which countries are evaluated to determine their LDC status).
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 Once Nigeria signs an EPA with the EU, it is of course not clear that the
agreement will necessarily prevent exports destined for Nigeria from reaching the LDCs.
See id.
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signing with ECOWAS members, further exacerbating
multiplicity of trade and related agreements in Africa. Another
example is Tanzania's decision to stay away from the Eastern and
Southern Africa (ESA) group of countries (essentially the
members of the EAC) in the negotiations over an EPA.397
Tanzania decided to negotiate its EPA under the SADC group with
which it is more ideologically aligned, rather than with the ESA
group. In so doing, Tanzania's choice of SADC, made to protect
its strategic interests, is a reflection of the argument advanced
here-that African RTAs offer alternative choices of how best to
advance the interests of the member countries. Indeed, Tanzania's
interests as a least developed country are not necessarily consistent
with those of countries like Kenya which is not a least developed
country under the classifications used by the United Nations.398
In SACU, Angola and Botswana are signing different EPA
agreements than those being signed by the rest of SADC's
members.3 99 In all, fifteen SADC members are negotiating EPAs
under four different configurations.4 °° Under the EPAs, African,
Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States' (ACP)4°' duty free and
full quota access to the EU will end, and they will be required to
open their own borders to European products and services.402 EPA
negotiations in the SACU region present a potential conflict
between SACU's Common External Tariffs (CET) structure and
397 Gathii, supra note 339.
398 See United Nations, World Population Prospects Population Database,
http://esa.un.org/unpp/definition.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) (defining "least
developed countries" and listing which countries are included in the group of least
developed countries).
399 Southern Africa Region Makes Progress on EPA, 13(1) BRIDGES 15, 15 (March
2009), available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridges/bridgesl3-1.pdf [hereinafter
Southern Africa Region].
400 Id.
401 The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group States (ACP) is a group of countries
created by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975. The group's main objectives are
sustainable development and poverty reduction within its member states, as well as their
greater integration into the world's economy. All of the member states, except Cuba, are
signatories of the Cotonou Agreement with the European Union. See generally ACP
Member States, The Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group States,
http://www.acpsec.org/en/acp_ states.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (listing the ACP
Member States).
402 See Southern Africa Region, supra note 399.
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the free trade commitments among SADC member States who are
negotiating their own EPA with the EU. The overlap between the
SACU CET and the free trade commitments under SADC are
likely to result in transshipment. This is because importers
enjoying a CET within SACU can export such imports to non-
SACU members who are members of SADC.4 0 3 I illustrate this
with the example of Swaziland in Part IV below.
The Cotonou Agreement, which is the basis of the EU's
negotiations with African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries over
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), does not also address
the question of who the proper parties to the EPAs should be.4 4
Are the proper parties the regions or countries themselves?
Ultimately, it is the countries that ought to sign the agreements
under their own constitutional rules. Yet, they have to negotiate as
groups-groups with differing interests. As we have seen above,
this in turn has resulted in the formation of de facto coalitions
within the context of EPA negotiations.
C. Criticisms of Multiple Memberships
As noted at the beginning of this Part, there are two categories
of criticisms regarding the multiplicity of memberships in Africa.
Each of these is addressed in turn.
D. Spaghetti Bowl: Are RTAs Building or Stumbling Blocks?
The path towards the establishment of an African Economic
Community is preceded by the establishment of six regional trade
agreements. These six trade agreements, referred to as the pillars
of the yet to be formed African Economic Community, are: The
East African Community;4 5 the Economic Community of West
African States;4 6  the Inter-Governmental Authority on
403 See Sean Woolfrey, South Africa's Concerns Over Interim Economic Partnership
Agreement, Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, Oct. 10, 2009, available at
http://www.tralac.org/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause-dir-newsitem&causeid=1694&
news id=75268&cat id=1058.
404 See generally EUROPEAN COMMISSION, The Cotonou Agreement, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintroen.cfn#revision2
(providing an overview of the agreement).
405 Treaty for the Establishment of the East Community, supra note 69.
406 ECOWAS, supra note 125.
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Development;4 °7  the Southern African Development
Community;408 the Common Market for Eastern and Central
Africa; 40 9 ECCAS 41° and the Arab Maghreb Union.411  In this
sense, the Treaty for the Establishment of the African Economic
Community regards these RTAs as building blocks towards an
eventual continent-wide trade block.
The economist Jagdish Bhagwati argued that multiple regional
and bilateral trade agreements are a stumbling rather than a
building block for the multilateral trade regime.412 Bhagwati has
referred to this increase in the number of bilateral and regional
trade agreements as the spaghetti bowl.4 13 Since the goal of each
of these agreements is to liberalize trade within the group,
Bhagwati argued these agreements had discriminatory
consequences for trade creation.414 For example, the same product
gets different tariff treatment depending on its origin since
members of a preferential trade arrangement treat their members
better off than they would non-members even if the same product
from the non-member was produced at a lower cost.415 In effect,
multiple bilateral and regional trade agreements undermine the
goal of non-discriminatory international trade under the umbrella
of the GATT/WTO framework since they create rules of origin
(RoO) that discriminate across products and countries.4 6 The ten
year assessment of the WTO, referred to as the Sutherland Report,
regretted the lack of harmonization produced by the complex web
407 Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development,
Mar. 21, 1996, available at http://igad.org/about/agreement-establishingigad.pdf.
408 Treaty of the Southern African Development, supra note 127.
409 Treaty for Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African,
supra note 65.
410 Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States, supra
note 122.
411 Treaty Establishing the Arab Maghreb Union, Feb. 17, 1989.
412 JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK (Princeton Univ.
Press 1991); see also Jagdish Bhagwati et al., Trading Preferentially: Theory and Policy,
108 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 1128, 1138 (1998).
413 See Bhagwati, supra note 349, at 1138.
414 Id.
415 Id.
416 Arvind Panagariya, Preferential Trade Liberalization: The Traditional Theory
andNew Developments, 38 J. OF ECON. LIT. 287, 328 (2000).
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of inconsistent rules of origin in multiple RTAs which in turn
increased transaction costs for business and hampered trade
flows." 7 These complex webs of rules of origin also counteract
trade creation as the ability of a partner country to undermine an
inefficient domestic industry is reduced, since they have the effect
of requiring a country bound by them to purchase inputs from less
efficient sources.I' In effect, the trade preferences which are
extended under bilateral and regional trade agreements undermine
the GATT/WTO rule that requires members to unconditionally
extend any trade concessions made to one WTO member to all
WTO member countries.
One of the primary justifications for the formation of RTAs is
geographic proximity among a group of countries. However,
Bhagwati and Panagariya argue that geographic proximity does
not provide benefits between natural trading partners as presumed
by its proponents for a number of reasons.419 First, they contend
that arguments about natural trading partners are based on static
theories that say little about trade diversion as a primary reason for
the establishment of regional trade agreements.420  Another
justification in support of the natural trading partners thesis is that
geographic proximity favors the formation of trading unions
between neighbors since this would eliminate large transport costs
in addition to promoting specialization in production. 421  But
according to Bhagwati and Panagariya, eliminating tariffs between
member countries in a regional grouping leaves each country
worse off as the resulting welfare gain will be less than the
revenue lost by the elimination of tariffs.422 In addition to lost
revenue, RTAs also result in trade diversion.423 Trade diversion
occurs where the creation of an RTA in one country leads to the
417 Peter Sutherland et al., The Future of the WTO Addressing Institutional
Challenges in the New Millennium, in REPORT BY THE CONSULTATIVE BOARD TO THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI 22 (2005).
418 Arvind Panagariya, The Regionalism Debate: An Overview 18 (revised draft
from November 1998), available at http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/wpawuwpit/
0309007.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
419 See Bhagwati et al., supra note 412, at 1134.
420 See id. at 1129.
421 See id. at 1130.
422 See id.
423 See id. at 1129.
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production of a similar product in a different country that is less
efficient than the first country but is less expensive to the other
country because preferential tariffs reduce the final cost of the
good.
424
Bhagwati and Panagariya also dispute the claim that RTAs
reduce tariffs among members. Their argument is based on the
fact that the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, which ended in the
mid-1990s, left a number of tariffs in place, particularly in
agriculture. 425 As such, preferential trade agreements among these
countries would be particularly harmful, because their exposure to
high external tariffs encouraged other countries to diversify away
from the products that are protected by high tariff walls.426
Finally, Bhagwati and Panagariya refute two other arguments
often made in favor of regional trade agreements-that reduced
transportation costs are a basis for formation of RTAs, (which are
alluded to in a different context above), and that a high volume of
427trade resulting from an RTA is good for both trading partners.
They argue that it is unlikely that a high initial volume of trade
will offset any form of trade diversion caused by two states
entering into an RTA. 428 They argue that this is unlikely because
elasticity of production is the primary determinant of the amount
of trade diversion, not the volume of trade.429 They point out that
in countries with imperfect substitutes, a gradual reduction in
tariffs leads to an eventual loss of welfare by each of the states
even though each state is specialized in the form of production for
each good.43°
For transport costs, the common wisdom is that lower transport
costs will allow countries to capture more of the marginal cost of
production because of fewer costs of production and sale.
Bhagwati and Panagariya argue that this is not necessarily true,
since a specialized producer can act as a monopolist and the
424 For a full, and quite useful explanation of trade diversion, see Panagariya, supra
note 416, at 290.
425 See Bhagwati et al., supra note 412, at 1130.
426 Id.
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increased cost of transport makes a distant country have a higher
elasticity.43" ' As a result, it is not always the best course of action
to sell only to countries with lower costs of transport.432 Bhagwati
and Panagariya also argue that lower transport costs for a
neighboring partner may also, however, be outweighed by cost
advantages in a distant one as is currently demonstrated by
China's ability to compete with other producers in the textile
market of many countries around the world.433  Bhagwati and
Panagariya therefore argue that these theories for the formation of
RTAs are "static" to the extent that they assume all welfare gains
and losses are created at the same time and are therefore
instantaneous.434  For this reason, Bhagwati and Panagariya
recommend a dynamic model of free trade.435 To them, a dynamic
theory of free trade is more consistent with a WTO-type system
than with the proliferation of RTAs.436
For these reasons, free trade economists argue that the best
solution to the problems posed by proliferation of RTAs is to
speed up multilateral, unconditional, most-favored-nation non-
discriminatory trade liberalization, since tariff preferences would
disappear once external tariffs drop to zero.437
E. High Transaction and Administrative Costs
A second category of criticisms relates to the high transaction
costs and administrative difficulties of complying with multiple
RoOs. 438  Multiple memberships sap the limited trade capacities
and budgets of African governments from focusing on a single
regional economic bloc. In addition, jurisdictional uncertainty
arises as a result of overlapping legal regimes. This criticism has
431 Bhagwati et al., supra note 412, at 1134.
432 Id.
433 Id. at 1142.
434 Id.
435 Id. at 1146.
436 Id.
437 Panagariya, supra note 416, at 328.
438 See, e.g., Won-Mog Choi, Defragmenting Fragmented Rules of Origin of RTAs:
A Building Block to Global Free Trade, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 111, 115 (2010) (arguing
that RoOs tend to especially discriminate against small poor developing countries and
that they act like tariffs on intermediate products levied by the country importing the
final good).
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much in common with the "spaghetti bowl" argument we saw
above and may in fact be regarded as a subset of it.439
One of the most important features of a customs union is that
all the member countries adopt one common external tariff
(CET). 44  This raises a major concern with regard to loss of
revenue for countries that enjoy monies from tariffs through their
various trade interests. In joining a customs union (CU), these
countries would be subject to one CET which could significantly
diminish the funds they previously collected through their own
agreements." There is also a fear that once a country joins a CU,
its trading policy cannot be altered without the consent of the other
union members." 2 Further, exporters who have benefited from
regional preferential market access will want to keep their unique
markets, and local producers who have benefited from favorable
rules of origin (RoO) will resist reductions in external trade
barriers and efforts to make rules less restrictive.4"
Difficulties may also arise from countries participating in
various RTAs including the human and financial costs associated
with membership, lack of harmonization of policies in the areas of
RoOs, customs procedures, and the changing political climate of
RTAs or the countries themselves. 4" Legal uncertainties may also
arise in cases where more than one trade arrangement applies to
trade between two countries." 5  Controversies regarding which
RTA has proper jurisdiction in cases where there is more than one
dispute settler may hinder trade by increasing transaction costs as
well as uncertainty among the Member Countries.
446
439 See section IV.D.
440 GATT, supra note 168, at art. XXIV.
441 See Yang & Gupta, supra note 355, at 14.
442 Id. at 6.
443 Id.
444 Alemayehu Geda & Haile Kebret, Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A
Review of Problems and Prospects with a Case Study of COMESA, 17 J. OF AFRICAN
ECON. 357, 371-72 (June 2008).
445 Cord Jakobeit et al., Overlapping Membership in COMESA, EAC, SACU and
SADC: Trade Policy Options for the Region and for EPA Negotiations 22 (2005),
available at http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-epa-overlapping-memberships-
2005.pdf.
446 See, e.g., William J. Davey and Andre Separ, The Soft Drinks Case: The WTO and
RegionalAgreements, 8 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 5, 17 (2009) ("It would obviously be
desirable from the perspective of avoiding duplication of proceedings and conservation
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When a country has membership in multiple RTAs, multiple
RoOs need to be applied. RoOs specify when a product will
qualify for duty-free movement within the RTA, and what
proportion of value must be added if it originates within the trade
bloc, or whether it is required that a product undergo a substantial
transformation in a country before being allowed to cross the
border duty free." 7 Knowing which RoOs to follow depends on
where commodities originate, and for states involved in various
RTAs, this undoubtedly makes the customs clearance process
more complex and delays transactions." 8  Increased RTAs
involvement of a country may cause the cost of shipping to climb
higher, in order to offset the need for increases in administrative
supervision necessary to keep track of proper origin
documentation and procedures." 9 This may in turn have the effect
of producers turning to other countries not involved in multiple
RTAs, or to those requiring less complex procedures.
Since Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) allow each of its
member-states to implement its own tariff structure, RoOs need to
be included in agreements involving FTAs in order to prevent
transshipment.45 ° Because FTAs do not have a CET, which is
typical of a customs union, RoOs are important in order to ensure
that a product destined to a high-tariff member country does not
first get imported through a lower-tariff member country.45 1 CETs
already in place make this type of trade deflection less of a
problem in customs unions.452 These are real and complex issues
regarding the transportation of goods among member states and
non-member states and states belonging to multiple RTAs that
would need to be addressed before customs unions are established.
However, according to Yang and Gupta, "given the small share of
of resources if there were agreements negotiated as to how to allocate jurisdiction over
disputes in respect of international agreements covering subjects in a way that multiple
dispute-settlement procedures might be expected to be invocable.").
447 Panagariya, supra note 418, at 17.
448 See Anne 0. Krueger, Problems with Overlapping Free Trade Areas, in
REGIONALISM VERSUS MULTILATERAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS 9, 18 (0. Takatoshi &
Anne 0. Krueger eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1997).
449 Id. at 16.
450 Jakobeit, supra note 445, at 46.
451 Panagariya, supra note 418, at 12.
452 Krueger, supra note 448, at 15.
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intraregional trade in Africa's total trade, the direct contribution of
any trade deflection to overall trade performance is likely to be
limited., 453 Further, an elimination of RoOs altogether may be a
solution to this problem as well. Transshipment would be
inevitable, as products would no doubt find their way into high-
tariff countries through low-tariff members; however, it could be
argued that this would force the high-tariff members to lower their
external tariffs in order to be competitive.454 This would in effect,
minimize trade diversion and have the secondary effect of creating
a CU in which the members of the FTA would be forced to agree
on a set CET.455
Multiple memberships in RTAs raise the possibility that a
country is at once a customs union as well as a member of an
FTA. Such a country would be able to enjoy preferential tariffs
from the FTA but would not be able to reciprocate the preferential
favor to the FTA, since it has to uphold its CET in the customs
union. If the commodities are valuable enough, those in the FTA
may deem these transactions to supersede the benefits of special
tariffs that they are unable to enjoy. This situation is currently
exemplified by Swaziland and its multiple memberships.
Swaziland is currently a member of SACU and COMESA (both
customs unions), as well as SADC which is currently an FTA.456
Swaziland is therefore a member of two customs unions and an
FTA. As a COMESA member, Swaziland enjoys free market
access within COMESA which has a fully developed FTA, but its
duty-free importing beyond COMESA and SACU is limited due to
their CETs.457 Membership in SACU's and COMESA's CETs
limits Swaziland's ability to extend more generous unilateral
concessions to non-SACU and non-COMESA members since this
would undermine Swaziland's CET commitments. For example, if
Swaziland were to extend such unilateral concessions to SADC
member countries who are neither SACU nor COMESA members,
it would undermine these customs unions and effectively
downgrade them into FTAs. In such a situation, the respective
453 Yang & Gupta, supra note 355, at 19.
454 Panagariya, supra note 418, at 17-18.
455 Id.
456 See infra Figure 1.
457 Jakobeit, supra note 445, at 60.
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RoOs would apply, thereby effectively making Swaziland a transit
country.45
F. Implications for African RTAs
If the goal of trade liberalization is to increase efficient
production and therefore to lower costs, African RTAs seem to
have strayed far from this goal. Reducing costs on each unit of
trade created by entering into the next RTA does not appear to be
the primary motivation for African countries belonging to more
than one RTA. Instead, multiple memberships in RTAs have been
driven by historical circumstances, political and ideological
considerations as well as strategic considerations such as access to
riparian waterways.459 In this sense, trade diversion may very well
have increased the magnitude of costs of production further
exacerbating the problems of trade liberalization within Africa.
Indeed African RTAs are not regarded by their members as
exclusively trade regimes.46 Rather, they serve multiple goals
including as frameworks for coordination of development projects
as alluded to more fully in Part I of this paper. Further, to the
extent to which African RTAs are regarded as trade regimes,
African countries have been most concerned with balancing gains
and losses and ensuring that the poorest members are compensated
for any losses they suffer as a result of liberalization commitments
as was demonstrated at length in the discussion on variable
geometry in Part II.
Large external tariffs still remain in place in a variety of
African countries, while other countries have lower tariffs on the
same product.46' This results in product diversion between
countries and effectively reduces the effectiveness of RTAs as
liberalizing trade regimes in Africa.462 Much of the current
available data supports the notion that RTAs are either ineffective
458 Id.
459 See discussion infra Part II.C.
460 Notably, Pravin Krishna and Jagdish Bhagwati have argued that it is possible to
pursue non-economic benefits within customs unions and for the members to come out
better off. See generally Krishna and Bhagwati, Necessarily Welfare Enhancing Customs
Unions With Industrialization Constraints: The Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati
Conjecture, 9 JAPAN & THE WORLD ECON. 441 (1997).
461 See Yang & Gupta, supra note 448, at 13.
462 Id.
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at stimulating inter-regional trade or are at best, non-factors.463 If
RTAs are to work optimally in promoting liberalizing trade, more
regional trade should be occurring and external trade increasing
due to specialization. However, between 2004 and 2006, many
African countries did not get involved with a great amount of
inter-regional trade.464 In this period, three countries, Swaziland,
Togo, and Zimbabwe, exported more than half of all exports to
countries inside of their regional grouping-SADC.465 Only five
countries exported more than half of their exports to Africa
generally, including Djibouti and Mali in addition to the countries
listed above.46 6 Many countries contributed ten percent or less of
total exports to African countries and even less to those within
their regional trade group. 467 Based on this data, ECCAS has three
of the ten bottom countries for inter-regional trade while
COMESA had two.468 Out of all of the RTAs, ECCAS had the
lowest volume of intra-regional trade with only $320 million of
exports traded between the countries.469
In COMESA, Kenya leads with a third of all exports with the
main export link being Kenya to Uganda.47 ° While many of these
countries do not contribute significantly to regional trade, many
have an obvious link to external markets. Gambia, for instance,
contributes twenty-three percent of its exports to intra-regional
trade among ECOWAS countries.471 While this is higher than
many African countries, seventy-one percent of Gambian exports
go to developed European countries.472 The same trend holds for
Botswana and Burundi. Both contribute around thirteen percent of
exports to inter-regional trade but contribute eighty-three and
463 Id.
464 Norbert Lebale et al., Economic Development in Africa Report 2009:
Strengthening Regional Economic Integration for Africa's Development, UNITED
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sixty-five percent of exports to Europe, respectively.473 This data
again supports the idea that transport costs are not the only factor,
if even a large factor in inter-regional trade success. A better
example might be Chad, a land locked, unstable country that
contributes only .01 percent of exports to the ECCAS but 99.8
percent of exports to Europe, the United States, and Asia.474 If
transport costs are the large barrier they are assumed to be, then
Chad would probably be doing a much larger amount of
interregional trade due to trade diversion created by increased
costs.
More recent data suggests the impact of the global recession
on African exports to the United States. Total African exports for
the United States for the year to date period from 2008 to 2009 are
down anywhere from four percent to ninety-nine percent with
some countries. However, some countries have increased their
share of trade with the United States.475 Chad's amount dropped
fifty-nine percent while South Africa dropped fifty-two percent.476
The question here becomes whether this is a permanent drop or
just a demand generated price shock that will resolve itself in the
short and medium term.
V. Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that African RTAs are flexible
legal regimes. These agreements are not designed to commit their
members to scrupulous and rigorous adherence; rather they have
been designed as flexible regimes of cooperation. These regimes
provide a forum for cooperation on a whole range of objectives,
including trade liberalization. They nestle or nest within these
regimes an entire range of other objectives including those relating
to security and the sharing of common river ways.
In so far as trade liberalization is concerned, African RTAs
have modified the neo-classical/comparative advantage classical
free trade model in two significant ways. First, African RTAs
473 Id.
474 Lebale, supra note 464, at 35.
475 AGOA, Resource on the African Growth and Opportunities Act, available at




AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
have embraced the principle of variable geometry according to
which time-tabled liberalization commitments are undertaken at
different speeds depending on the economic ability and interest of
members. Second, these regimes have made distributional equity
amongst themselves a central feature. This means they have
designed compensatory mechanisms to ensure losses arising from
liberalization commitments are given to the losers. By
foregrounding variable geometry and distributional equity
concerns, African RTAs have correspondingly distanced
themselves from non-discriminatory free trade.
In addition, the multiplicity of memberships in African RTAs
while further confirming their nature as flexible regimes, also
illustrates how they are a classic case of the "spaghetti bowl."
Thus while flexibility has enmeshed well with the preferences of
African governments not to build strong supranational
bureaucracies, it has undermined the achievement of more
thorough intra-regional trade. Since African governments
understand these RTAs as flexible regimes, they regard them less
from the efficiency gains that non-discriminatory free trade may
offer, but rather from the short-term benefits that these regimes
offer, particularly as forums for integrated development of
common resources such as river basins, and in terms of any gains
arising from functionally specific objectives that may be nestled
within these regimes that do not have to await the long term
horizon which non-discriminatory free trade is likely to offer.
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